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POSNERIAN HEARSAY: SLAYING THE DISCRETION DRAGON 
Liesa L. Richter* 
Abstract 
Distinguished jurist and scholar, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit penned a concurrence in United 
States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2014), in which he launched a 
scathing attack on the scheme of categorical hearsay exceptions 
embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence. After characterizing the 
existing hearsay regime as bad “folk psychology,” Judge Posner called 
for the repeal of categorical hearsay exceptions in favor of case-by-case 
determinations about the “reliability” of particular hearsay statements by 
trial judges. Prior to adoption of the Federal Rules, evidence experts 
debated whether a case-by-case or categorical approach to hearsay 
exceptions was superior. Judge Posner’s concurrence in Boyce resurrects 
that debate. Recent evidence scholarship highlights differences of 
opinion regarding the operation and propriety of specific hearsay 
exceptions within the Federal Rules of Evidence. Not until the gateway 
question raised in Boyce about the proper structure of the hearsay regime 
is resolved may the debate proceed concerning which hearsay exceptions 
belong in a categorical regime fit to serve the twenty-first century. 
This Article explores Judge Posner’s proposal through an economic 
lens, specifically highlighting the costs and benefits of the purely 
discretionary approach he proposes. On the cost side of the ledger, the 
article points out the decrease in predictability that a case-by-case 
reliability approach to hearsay would create and examines the litigation 
consequences of such decreased information flow. This Article also 
cautions against the damage to consistency and fairness certain to follow 
case-by-case consideration of all hearsay. Further, this Article highlights 
the scant benefits of a discretionary approach to hearsay. The Article 
concludes that Judge Posner’s proposal represents a bad bargain for the 
law of evidence and suggests that efforts to reform the hearsay regime 
would be more effectively focused on modifying existing categorical 
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exceptions or in pursuing a truly new paradigm for hearsay evidence that 
eliminates amorphous considerations of “reliability” altogether. Thus, the 
Article urges the rejection of the purely discretionary model for 
evaluating hearsay evidence once and for all and seeks to stimulate 
thought about hearsay reforms that move evidence law forward. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A teenager tweeting about events or activities at the very moment that 
she observes them is likely to give a reliable account of those events or 
activities.1 
 
A 911 caller suffering significant distress following a violent assault 
is likely to provide a reliable account of that assault.2 
 
A patient would not lie to a treating physician about his symptoms or 
other relevant habits and history.3 
 
All but the most credulous would reject the universality of these 
statements. Characterized most benignly, such truisms about human 
behavior are overly broad, if not patently fictional. Yet, these statements 
represent just a few of the assumptions underlying hearsay exceptions 
routinely applied to admit hearsay evidence in federal court.4 
American hearsay doctrine is complex and sometimes 
counterintuitive, consisting of a prohibition on hearsay evidence 
punctuated by dozens of hearsay exceptions authorizing the admission of 
certain categories of hearsay statements in federal trials.5 Mastery of the 
maze of hearsay exceptions embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
(Federal Rules) is an important rite of passage for American law students 
and a hallmark of an accomplished trial attorney.6 Lauded as the law’s 
most “celebrated nightmare,” the American hearsay regime has drawn 
considerable criticism from the bench, bar, and academy due to its 
byzantine structure and antiquated requirements.7 Numerous scholars and 
judges have explored proposals for reform. Some have suggested modest 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (providing a hearsay exception for present sense impressions).  
 2. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (providing a hearsay exception for excited utterances). 
 3. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4) (providing a hearsay exception for statements made for 
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis). 
 4. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2), 803(4) (providing hearsay exceptions for present sense 
impressions, excited utterances, and statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment, respectively). 
 5. See FED. R. EVID. 802 (prohibiting admission of hearsay evidence unless otherwise 
provided by federal statutes, rules of evidence, or Supreme Court rules); FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)–
(2), 803, 804, 807 (providing for the admissibility of certain hearsay statements). 
 6. See David Alan Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 1 [hereinafter 
Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah] (opining that lawyers sometimes develop a “fondness” for the 
“oddities of hearsay law” but that it is the sort of “affection a volunteer docent might develop for 
the creaky, labyrinthine corridors of an ancient mansion, haphazardly expanded over the 
centuries”); David Alan Sklansky, What Evidence Scholars Can Learn from the Work of Stephen 
Yeazell: History, Rulemaking, and the Lawyer’s Fundamental Conflict, 61 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 150, 159 (2013) [hereinafter Sklansky, What Evidence] (“[I]n terms of forbidding 
mystery is there any parallel to the law of hearsay anywhere in the law school curriculum?”). 
 7. See Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 6, at 11 (quoting PETER MURPHY, 
EVIDENCE AND ADVOCACY 24 (5th ed. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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reforms to the existing hearsay system.8 Others have crafted thoughtful 
proposals for the complete transformation of the hearsay regime.9 
Joining the chorus of hearsay dissidents, a three-judge panel of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently echoed oft-
repeated critiques of two commonly utilized exceptions to the hearsay 
rule: the present sense impression exception and the excited utterance 
exception. In its opinion in United States v. Boyce, the Seventh Circuit 
panel posited that both hearsay exceptions rest upon highly suspect 
assumptions supported only by “folk psychology.”10 Judge Richard 
Posner, a distinguished and influential jurist and scholar, penned a 
separate concurrence for the purpose of amplifying his concerns about 
both hearsay exceptions.11 In his concurrence, Judge Posner proposed the 
repeal of the intricate system of categorical hearsay exceptions in the 
Federal Rules.12 He suggested simplifying hearsay doctrine by creating a 
single hearsay exception that would admit hearsay based upon a trial 
judge’s assessment of the reliability of particular hearsay statements 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Case for eHearsay, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1317, 1318–20 
(2014) [hereinafter Bellin, Case for eHearsay] (proposing the addition of an ehearsay exception 
to the existing hearsay regime to allow for increased flow of electronic communications into the 
trial process); Jeffrey Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, and the Uncertain Future of Present Sense 
Impressions, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 331, 337–38 (2012) [hereinafter Bellin, Facebook, Twitter] 
(advocating a corroboration limitation on the present sense impression exception to control flow 
of electronic hearsay); Frank W. Bullock, Jr. & Steven Gardner, Prior Consistent Statements and 
the Premotive Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 534 (1997) (advocating the substantive 
admissibility of all prior consistent statements admitted to rehabilitate); Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
The Need to Resurrect the Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: A Relapse in Hearsay 
Policy, 52 HOW. L.J. 319, 325–26 (2009) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect] 
(decrying judicial retreat from present sense impression); Liesa L. Richter, Seeking Consistency 
for Prior Consistent Statements: Amending Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), 46 CONN. L. 
REV. 937, 942–43 (2014) [hereinafter Richter, Seeking Consistency] (proposing revisions to the 
amended hearsay exception for prior consistent statements). 
 9. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic, Game-Theoretic Analysis 
of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (suggesting a hearsay model based upon a 
determination about which party should bear the cost of producing the hearsay declarant); Paul S. 
Milich, Hearsay Antinomies: The Case for Abolishing the Rule and Starting Over, 71 OR. L. REV. 
723, 774–78 (1992) (proposing the broadening of admissible hearsay with procedural 
protections); Roger Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 51, 
54 (1987) (proposing to expand the admissibility of hearsay in civil cases); Michael L. Seigel, 
Rationalizing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REV. 893, 896 
(1992) (proposing a hearsay framework designed to determine when hearsay evidence constitutes 
the best available evidence); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1339, 1341–42 (1987) (suggesting the admission of more factual information to assist 
juries in evaluating hearsay in place of the restrictive exclusion of hearsay evidence). 
 10. 742 F.3d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[A]s with much of the folk psychology of evidence, 
it is difficult to take this rationale entirely seriously.” (quoting Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 
588 (7th Cir. 2004))). 
 11. Id. at 799 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 12. Id. at 802. 
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proffered at trial in place of a classification-based system in which the 
category to which a particular hearsay statement belongs drives 
admissibility.13  
Recent evidence scholarship highlights differences of opinion 
regarding the operation and propriety of specific hearsay exceptions 
within the existing categorical approach taken by the Federal Rules.14 
With the explosion of electronically stored communications, much of the 
modern debate focuses on the problems of admitting electronic 
communications, or “eHearsay,” through traditional categorical hearsay 
exceptions.15 The recent Seventh Circuit opinion in Boyce, however, 
raises a more fundamental issue that has long been a source of debate 
among evidence scholars: whether the categorical construct for the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence adopted by the Federal Rules is the 
optimal approach to hearsay evidence. While Judge Posner’s critique of 
the categorical hearsay regime is not entirely novel, harsh criticism from 
such a respected quarter threatens to undermine public confidence in the 
Federal Rules. Not until scholars lay to rest this gateway question about 
the proper structure of a hearsay regime may the debate proceed 
concerning which hearsay exceptions belong in a categorical regime fit 
to serve the twenty-first century.  
This Article examines Judge Posner’s proposal to abandon the 
existing categorical hearsay exceptions. Although some criticisms of the 
existing hearsay exceptions may be well-founded and may indeed extend 
beyond the two exceptions treated in Boyce, it is impossible to determine 
whether those shortcomings militate in favor of a particular reform 
without significant exploration of the proposed alternative. This Article 
uses an economic lens to examine Judge Posner’s proposed alternative, 
specifically highlighting the costs and benefits of the purely discretionary 
approach he proposes. On the cost side of the ledger, this Article points 
out the decrease in predictability that a single catchall approach to 
hearsay would create. This Article explores the litigation consequences 
of such decreased information flow about the admissibility of evidence 
in both criminal and civil cases. In addition, this Article laments the 
serious harm to consistency and fairness certain to result from case-by-
case consideration of all hearsay.  
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 8, at 1327–35 (describing the debate 
over the eHearsay proposal); Steven W. Teppler, Testable Reliability: A Modernized Approach to 
ESI Admissibility, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 213, 225 (2014); Richter, Seeking Consistency, supra 
note 8, at 940. 
 15. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, eHearsay, 98 MINN. L. REV. 7, 9–10 (2013) [hereinafter Bellin, 
eHearsay]; Colin Miller, No Explanation Required? A Reply to Jeffrey Bellin’s eHearsay, 98 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 34, 56–57 (2013). But see Liesa L. Richter, Don’t Just Do Something!: 
E-hearsay, the Present Sense Impression, and the Case for Caution in the Rulemaking Process, 
61 AM. U. L. REV. 1657, 1660–62 (2012) [hereinafter Richter, Case for Caution]. 
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After exploring the costs of case-by-case treatment of hearsay 
evidence, this Article highlights the scant benefits of a discretionary 
approach to hearsay. Free to evaluate the reliability of “particular” 
hearsay statements uttered by human declarants, trial judges are likely to 
resort to the same folk psychology that drives the existing system of 
exceptions. To the extent that they exercise any meaningful control over 
trial judge hearsay determinations, appellate courts may craft common 
law exceptions to the hearsay rule that strongly resemble those that Judge 
Posner seeks to displace. Indeed, the hearsay exceptions embodied in the 
Federal Rules largely derive from categories of hearsay admissible during 
the common law era preceding the Federal Rules.16 Judge Posner’s 
proposal for reform in Boyce thus threatens to be a costly exercise in 
futility. This Article ultimately concludes that a single discretionary 
hearsay exception would diminish efficiency and fairness in the litigation 
market at a time when exploding costs threaten the utility of the jury trial 
as a mechanism for dispute resolution. 17  
A thoughtful weighing of the merits and demerits of a discretionary 
approach to evidence decisions, and the admissibility of hearsay 
specifically, preceded the adoption of the Federal Rules.18 Following 
years of study, a distinguished advisory committee determined that 
individualized treatment of hearsay statements involved “too great a 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:66, 
at 560 (4th ed. 2013) (“Most of [the hearsay exceptions in Federal Rule of Evidence 803] are 
restatements of exceptions that had evolved at common law.”). 
 17. Recent rule making has revolved around reducing mounting litigation costs. See, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 502 advisory committee’s note (stating that the 2008 rule of evidence “responds to 
the widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect against waiver of attorney-
client privilege or work product have become prohibitive”); REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2014), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf (including 
Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, to Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
(June 14, 2014) (describing proposed amendments to discovery rules and noting public comment 
that disproportional litigation costs bar many from access to federal courts)).  
 18. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, 
Rules of Evidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing 
Uniform Rules of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts, 30 F.R.D. 73, 95, 109 (1962) [hereinafter 
Preliminary Report]; Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary of the “Preliminary Study 
of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Federal 
Courts”: Mission Accomplished?, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (2011) [hereinafter 
Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary]; see also Josh Camson, History of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, PROOF, Spring 2010, available at https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial 
_skills/061710-trial-evidence-federal-rules-of-evidence-history.html (last visited May 25, 2015). 
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measure of judicial discretion.”19 Judge Posner’s proposal seeks to rehash 
that debate, to discard forty years of hearsay doctrine, and to venture 
down the discretionary hearsay road less traveled. This back-to-the-future 
approach to hearsay reform fails to move the law forward. Thus, this 
Article posits that the discretionary methodology proposed by Judge 
Posner in Boyce represents a hearsay model that was amply debated in 
the pre-Rules era, that failed to gain approval as an efficient and 
predictable roadmap for the admission of hearsay evidence, and that 
should be laid to rest once and for all.  
This Article does not suggest, however, that existing hearsay doctrine 
is perfect or that it should remain eternally entrenched in what some may 
view as antiquated “dogma.”20 Rather, this Article demonstrates that 
rational reasons exist for continuing to experiment with a categorical 
model for admitting hearsay. Additionally, this Article outlines the 
mechanisms available to improve and refine that hearsay model to 
address some of the concerns raised by Judge Posner in Boyce. This 
Article posits that there is cause for optimism concerning modifications 
and interpretations within the categorical regime that will equip that 
regime to deal with hearsay evidence of the twenty-first century.  
This Article, therefore, cautions that it is wise to tread carefully in 
making any sweeping reforms to the hearsay scheme that litigants and 
judges have been utilizing for forty years under the Federal Rules. That 
said, should a continued effort to refine and improve the categorical 
hearsay exceptions fail to yield coherent and supportable outcomes, an 
alternative to the categorical approach certainly could be considered. 
Importantly, to move the law forward, any overhaul of the hearsay regime 
should increase the predictability and consistency of hearsay doctrine to 
facilitate the fair and efficient valuation and resolution of lawsuits. 
Scholars have offered thought-provoking proposals for the complete 
transformation of hearsay doctrine.21 Many of those alternatives could 
realize the critical goal of increasing the predictability and rationality of 
hearsay doctrine by eliminating a slippery reliability filter for admitting 
hearsay evidence. In sum, while it is time to discard a discretionary 
approach to hearsay evidence, the search for potential improvements to 
the existing hearsay regime is a game that is worth the candle.  
 Part I of this Article traces briefly the common law evolution of 
hearsay doctrine to the enactment of the Federal Rules in 1975. Part I also 
describes the categorical hearsay regime embodied in the Federal Rules, 
as well as common criticisms of that model. Part II examines the Seventh 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Advisory Committee’s Introductory Note on Hearsay Problem, in 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN 
& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 802App.100 (Joseph M. 
McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2002) (compiling the legislative history of Rule 802).  
 20. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 21. See sources cited supra note 9. 
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Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Boyce, highlighting Judge Posner’s 
concerns about the present sense impression and excited utterance 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. In addition, Part II lays out Judge Posner’s 
tripartite proposal for reform, which calls for a discretionary case-by-case 
evaluation of hearsay evidence. Part III of this Article identifies the 
consequences of the reform suggested by Judge Posner in Boyce, 
emphasizing valuation difficulties and decreased litigation efficiency 
likely to result from such a change. Although Judge Posner’s proposed 
reform tempts with an elegant and simplistic antidote to the complexity 
of the Federal Rules, Part III posits several reasons why this proposed 
alternative remains inferior to the existing hearsay regime. Part IV 
theorizes about the fundamental failure of the Posner proposal to move 
the law forward and explores alternative avenues for addressing 
perceived deficiencies in the existing hearsay regime more directly and 
efficiently. In conclusion, this Article urges the rejection of the purely 
discretionary model for evaluating hearsay evidence once and for all and 
seeks to stimulate thought about hearsay reforms that move evidence law 
forward. 
I.  HEARSAY: THAT WAS THEN; THIS IS NOW 
Hearsay may be defined simply as an out-of-court statement of a 
person that is offered during trial for the purpose of proving the truth of 
that prior statement.22 For example, when a prosecutor offers at trial a 
victim’s statements to a 911 operator recounting an assault to prove that 
the assault actually occurred, those statements constitute hearsay 
evidence.23 Because of concerns regarding the reliability of such out-of-
court statements and the difficulty in evaluating them fairly without 
contemporaneous cross-examination of the speaker or “declarant,” the 
American legal system has long prohibited the admission of hearsay, 
deeming it an unreliable “tale of a tale.”24 At the same time, the American 
system has recognized exceptions to the hearsay prohibition in 
circumstances where the reliability of and need for hearsay statements is 
paramount.25 The struggle to separate the admissible from the 
inadmissible in the realm of hearsay has raged for centuries and remains 
                                                                                                                     
 22. FED. R. EVID. 801(a)–(c). 
 23. See Boyce, 742 F.3d at 796–98 (majority opinion) (noting that statements made to a 911 
operator by Boyce’s girlfriend constituted hearsay evidence requiring hearsay exceptions to admit 
them).  
 24. GEORGE E. DIX ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244, at 539 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 
7th ed. 2014). 
 25. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 19, § 802App.100 (“The solution evolved by the 
common law has been a general rule excluding hearsay but subject to numerous exceptions under 
circumstances supposed to furnish guarantees of trustworthiness.”).  
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ongoing in the American contemporary trial system.26 Today, the Federal 
Rules govern the admissibility of hearsay evidence in federal court, and 
the majority of states largely follow the Federal Rules’ model.27 
A.  Common Law 
The codification of the rules of evidence is a recent phenomenon in the 
United States.28 Before the enactment of the Federal Rules in 1975, 
evidence rules were largely the product of judicial decisions defining 
admissible and inadmissible evidence.29 It was within the context of this 
common law of evidence that modern hearsay doctrine was shaped.30 Prior 
to the Federal Rules, federal cases uniformly recognized a general 
prohibition on hearsay evidence.31 Those decisions also carved out 
exceptions to that prohibition.32 For example, cases consistently accepted 
the “former testimony” and “dying declaration” exceptions to the hearsay 
rule imported from English common law.33 The decisions also 
contemplated the admissibility of many other hearsay statements, 
including those comprising part of the res gestae of underlying events 
being litigated.34 The famous Supreme Court decision in Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Hillmon endorsed an exception for hearsay statements 
                                                                                                                     
 26. See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the 
Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1186 (1996) (noting examples of hearsay in seventeenth-
century papers).  
 27.  1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that forty-five states now have 
evidence codes closely tracking the federal rules).  
 28. 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J. CAPRA, FEDERAL RULES 
OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 2–4 (7th ed. 1998) (detailing the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1975). 
 29. Id. at 2 (describing the approach to evidentiary decision-making under former Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 43 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 prior to enactment of 
Federal Rules). 
 30. See supra note 16; see also Eleanor Swift, One Hundred Years of Evidence Law Reform: 
Thayer’s Triumph, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2437, 2439 (2000) (tracing the history of twentieth-century 
evidence reform through the codification efforts led by Professor James Bradley Thayer, Dean 
John Henry Wigmore, and Professor Edmund M. Morgan and the ultimate drafting of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence in 1975).  
 31. See DIX ET AL., supra note 24, § 244, at 539 (noting the characterization of the hearsay 
ban as “that most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American Law of Evidence” (quoting 5 JOHN 
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 
1974))).  
 32. See id. § 253, at 243 (“The traditional solution has been to recognize numerous 
exceptions where ‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness’ justify departure from the general 
rule excluding hearsay.” (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 31, § 1422)). 
 33. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (admitting former testimony into 
evidence); United States v. Barnes, 464 F.2d 828, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (admitting dying statement 
of murder victim into evidence). 
 34. See Edmund M. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WASH. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (1937). 
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describing the contemporaneous feelings or intentions of the declarant.35 
In addition, hearsay exceptions for party admissions, business records, 
declarations against interest, and many others recognized under the 
Federal Rules can be traced to pre-Rules practice.36 
The common law approach to evidentiary doctrine proved challenging 
to navigate, and critics described it as a “scattered” and disorganized 
“crazy quilt.”37 Ascertaining the admissibility of a particular piece of 
evidence often required sorting through “voluminous” cases and treatises 
to “search[] out” an applicable rule.38 Critics of the common law 
approach to evidence law suggested that evidence principles needed to be 
“easily accessible” to enable judges and lawyers to apply them “quickly 
in the heat of battle.”39 Some commentators advocated a “‘pocket bible’ 
of the law of evidence” in the form of a “brief pamphlet” as a tool that 
lawyers and judges could quickly read and digest for real-time application 
at trial.40  
B.  Rules of Evidence 
Because of the difficulties inherent in locating and applying an 
increasingly complex common law of evidence, incentives to codify the 
rules of evidence mounted.41 Even among proponents of codification, 
however, views differed sharply regarding the optimal form and 
appropriate substance for rules of evidence.42  
                                                                                                                     
 35. 145 U.S. 285, 295 (1892).  
 36. See United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 769 & n.2 (10th Cir. 1975) (discussing the 
party admission exception and citing pre-Rules precedent); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 
243, 273 (1913) (discussing the hearsay exception for a declaration against a pecuniary interest); 
see also Federal Business Records Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970) (authorizing admission of 
business records prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules). 
 37. E.g., Edmund M. Morgan & John MacArthur Maguire, Looking Backward and 
Forward at Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937); see also Preliminary Report, supra note 
18, at 73, 115. 
 38. See Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary, supra note 18, at 1372–73 (quoting 
Preliminary Report, supra note 18, at 109–10).  
 39. See id. at 1369 (quoting Preliminary Report, supra note 18, at 115); Preliminary Report, 
supra note 18, at 109; see also SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 28, at 2 (“[M]uch of the impetus 
toward legislation arose from enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the late 
1930’s.”). 
 40. See Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary, supra note 18, at 1373; 21 CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5006 n.41 (2d ed. 2005). 
 41. See supra note 38. 
 42. Swift, supra note 30, at 2457–58 (discussing the debate between Dean Wigmore and 
Professor Morgan regarding the adoption of common law standards as well as the desired 
specificity of evidence rules); see also 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 1.2, at 11–
13 (describing the tension between advocates of more restrictive rules and proponents of trial 
judge discretion).  
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Dean John Henry Wigmore, noted twentieth-century evidence 
scholar, favored the restatement of common law evidence standards in 
the form of highly specific rules, detailing appropriate evidentiary rulings 
in particularized factual contexts that would significantly restrict trial 
judge discretion.43 In keeping with this philosophy, Dean Wigmore 
drafted a “Code of Evidence”44 that proved ponderous and 
unmanageable.45 Professor Edmund M. Morgan, Dean Wigmore’s 
contemporary, also favored codification of the law of evidence but 
espoused a different philosophy.46 Professor Morgan expressed little faith 
in common law evidentiary standards, emphasizing the haphazard 
process by which they were crafted.47 Therefore, Professor Morgan 
envisioned a code of evidence embodying significant reforms to the 
common law.  
Professor Morgan did not differ from Dean Wigmore merely with 
respect to the content of an evidence code, but also as to its form. In place 
of highly particularized standards, Professor Morgan favored more 
general evidence standards. He envisioned that trial judges would employ 
such standards to determine the admissibility of evidence in a fact-
specific context, thus allowing for greater flexibility and judicial 
discretion in evidentiary rulings.48 Another commentator advocated for 
even more flexibility in evidentiary decisions, with all details regarding 
admissibility left to the trial judge.49 According to Professor Morgan, the 
choice in drafting rules of evidence was between “a catalogue, a creed, 
and a Code.”50  
Professor Morgan served as the reporter for the American Law 
Institute’s Model Code of Evidence (Model Code) proposed in 1942, 
which captured Professor Morgan’s views about appropriate evidence 
standards.51 The Model Code employed standards and factors limiting 
trial judge discretion concerning the admissibility of evidence but did not 
                                                                                                                     
 43. See Swift, supra note 30, at 2457–58 (describing Dean Wigmore’s detailed approach to 
the “best evidence” rule).  
 44. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A POCKET CODE OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1st ed. 1910).  
 45. See K.T.F., Book Note, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 494 (1910) (reviewing WIGMORE, supra 
note 44).  
 46. Swift, supra note 30, at 2455, 2457. 
 47. See id. at 2457 (describing Professor Morgan’s view of common law evidence 
standards). 
 48. Id. (contrasting Professor Morgan’s version of the best evidence rule with Dean 
Wigmore’s). 
 49. Id. at 2459 (describing Judge Charles E. Clark’s proposal to allow “an even more liberal 
form of discretion than was envisioned by Morgan”).  
 50. Id. (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 1, 12–13 
(1942)). 
 51. See id.; SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 28, at 2. 
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spell out highly particularized factual scenarios warranting exclusion.52 
In keeping with Professor Morgan’s disdain for the common law of 
evidence, the Model Code made drastic reforms, including the rejection 
of the categorical approach to hearsay exceptions.53 Under the Model 
Code, hearsay statements were admissible regardless of their content or 
context either when the hearsay declarant was “unavailable” to testify at 
trial, or when the hearsay declarant was “present and subject to cross-
examination” at trial.54 The “radical” nature of the hearsay provision in 
the Model Code,55 which expanded the admissibility of hearsay and 
abandoned traditionally recognized categories of admissible hearsay, 
generated dissent and even “hostility” toward the Model Code.56 
Accordingly, no state adopted the Model Code.57 
The Federal Rules became effective in 1975 following eight years of 
drafting work by a distinguished advisory committee.58 The Federal 
Rules that were proposed for Congressional review represented a 
compromise in the historical codification debate between Dean Wigmore 
and Professor Morgan. In terms of form, the Federal Rules eschewed 
highly particularized rules in favor of broader categorical standards and 
limitations, thus adopting Professor Morgan’s philosophy of a “Code” of 
evidence rules rather than a “catalogue.”59 Although the Federal Rules 
avoided the cumbersome “catalogue” approach to evidentiary rules 
advanced by Dean Wigmore, they did not create a wide-open “creed” 
approach that left all decisions about the admissibility of evidence to the 
discretion of the trial judge.60 Some of the Federal Rules, such as Rule 
403, expressly grant discretion to trial judges to weigh evidence and 
exercise judgment according to articulated factors.61 Others, such as the 
                                                                                                                     
 52. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE r. 503 (1942).  
 53. See id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. cmt. a. 
 56. See Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 6, at 20 (“[The] professional reception 
[for the Model Rules] varied between chilliness and heated antagonism.” (quoting JOHN 
MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE: COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 153 (1947)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
 57. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 28, at 2 (“[N]o jurisdiction ever adopted the Model Code 
of Evidence.”). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed 
Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953, which were simpler and less radical than the Model Code. 
Id. at 3. Only a “handful of jurisdictions” adopted evidence codes based upon the Uniform Rules. 
Id. 
 58. Id. at 3–4. 
 59. Swift, supra note 30, at 2458–59. 
 60. Id. at 2462. 
 61. Id.  
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hearsay rules, create categorical restrictions requiring the trial judge to 
admit or exclude evidence falling within designated parameters.62  
The optimal nature of hearsay rules in particular was a topic of intense 
debate among evidence luminaries of the twentieth century, with some 
commentators advocating a discretionary approach to the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence.63 Indeed, a preliminary draft of the hearsay exceptions 
prepared by the advisory committee adopted a discretionary approach 
based upon the reliability of proffered hearsay, listing modern categorical 
exceptions only as “illustrations.”64 The shortcomings of discretionary 
treatment of hearsay evidence ultimately led to the “prescriptive and 
limiting” categorical exceptions, more in keeping with the “Code” 
philosophy that underlies the Federal Rules today.65  
Rule 802 of the Federal Rules prohibits the admission of hearsay 
evidence, except as provided by federal statutes, the Federal Rules 
themselves, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.66 Rule 801 
defines hearsay as a statement “that the declarant does not make while 
testifying at the current trial or hearing” and that a party offers “to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”67 The hearsay 
                                                                                                                     
 62. Compare FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that the court “may exclude relevant evidence if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by” certain dangers), with FED. R. EVID. 803(1) 
(permitting the trial court to admit a hearsay statement that “describ[es] or explain[s] an event or 
condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it”). For a description of 
different types of evidence rules affording varying levels of judicial discretion, see Swift, supra 
note 30, at 2462–63.  
 63. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:66, at 561 (explaining that a 
preliminary draft of the hearsay rules took “an open approach to hearsay that emphasized the 
admissibility of reliable hearsay”); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWA L. 
REV. 331, 337–38 (1961) (advocating greater discretionary power in trial judges to admit hearsay 
evidence and criticizing class-based hearsay exceptions). 
 64. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts and 
Magistrates—March 1969, 46 F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft of March 
1969] (stating that Rule 8-03(a) would have permitted admission of a hearsay statement “if its 
nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not 
likely to be enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness, even though he is available”). 
 65. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:66, at 561 (noting that later drafts 
of the Federal Rules “abandoned this open approach in favor of the traditional closed one, in 
which the list of exceptions was prescriptive and limiting rather than exemplary and illustrative”); 
see also FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee’s introductory note on the hearsay problem, 
reprinted in WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 19, § 802App.100, at 802App.-4 (“The 
Advisory Committee has rejected this [individualized treatment] approach to hearsay as involving 
too great a measure of judicial discretion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, enhancing the 
difficulties of preparation for trial, adding a further element to the already over-complicated 
congeries of pretrial procedures, and requiring substantially different rules for civil and criminal 
cases.”).  
 66. FED. R. EVID. 802.  
 67. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
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prohibition continues to rest on concerns about the fact finder’s reliance 
upon out-of-court statements absent the opportunity to evaluate the 
reliability of those statements during live cross-examination under oath 
with the declarant’s demeanor on display.68  
This hearsay prohibition is notoriously riddled with exceptions. Five 
basic categories of hearsay are admissible under the Federal Rules. 
Certain prior statements of a testifying witness who is subject to cross-
examination at trial about those prior statements are admissible “non-
hearsay” under the Federal Rules.69 Statements made or adopted by an 
opposing party, its agents, or coconspirators may also be admitted against 
that party to prove the truth of the matter asserted in those statements.70 
Rule 803 of the Federal Rules permits twenty-three different types of 
hearsay statements to be admitted for their truth, regardless of the 
availability of the declarant, based upon assumptions about the reliability 
of human statements made in certain contexts or for certain purposes.71 
The present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions criticized 
in Boyce are located in Rule 803.72 Five additional exceptions are 
available for certain hearsay statements when the declarant is unavailable 
to testify at trial.73 Finally, Rule 807 preserves discretion for a trial judge 
to admit hearsay not within any of the categorical hearsay exceptions if 
that hearsay “has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”74 
C.  Criticisms of the Categorical Hearsay Model 
There has been longstanding academic criticism of the categorical 
hearsay regime contained in the Federal Rules, and many have offered 
proposals for reform.75 Scholars have criticized the over-breadth of the 
                                                                                                                     
 68. 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:3, at 28–30 (describing four hearsay 
risks and the rationale for the hearsay prohibition). 
 69. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). 
 70. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 71. See FED. R. EVID. 803; Jeffrey Bellin, The Incredible Shrinking Confrontation Clause, 
95 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1910 (2012).  
 72. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)–(2); United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 800–01 (7th Cir. 
2014) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 73. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b). 
 74. See FED. R. EVID. 807. The “residual exception” to the hearsay rule also requires that 
the proponent offer the hearsay as evidence of a “material fact” and that it is “more probative” 
than “any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.” Id. The 
exception also cautions that the judge should admit such hearsay only when admission serves the 
“interests of justice” and when the adverse party receives pretrial notice. Id. 
 75. See sources cited supra note 9 (citing articles criticizing the current hearsay regime and 
offering proposals for reform); see also 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:2, at 26 
& n.2 (noting that the “underlying theme” of most commentary is that “more hearsay should be 
admissible, especially in civil cases”). 
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ban on hearsay evidence.76 Echoing a Model Rules’ philosophy, some 
have argued that nothing justifies a prohibition on hearsay evidence when 
the declarant is either (1) present at trial for the opposing party to cross-
examine before the jury or (2) unavailable to testify at trial, making the 
preferred live testimony impossible.77 Scholars also have questioned the 
hearsay ban’s inherent distrust of juries, suggesting that jurors may be 
capable of discerning and discounting unreliable hearsay.78 Many critics 
have derided the “myth” of the hearsay prohibition, emphasizing the 
voluminous hearsay exceptions that swallow the Rule.79 Numerous 
commentators have lamented the complicated and labyrinthine structure 
of the categorical hearsay regime that requires litigants to consult dozens 
of provisions to assess the admissibility of hearsay evidence.80 Finally, 
critics have questioned the purported justifications for specific 
categorical hearsay exceptions and the reliability of assumptions about 
human behavior that support them.81  
                                                                                                                     
 76. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:2, at 26 & n.2; Richard D. Friedman, 
Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545, 564 (1998) 
(advocating broad admissibility of hearsay in civil cases). 
 77. See Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 6, at 9–10 (noting the “familiar if 
discomfiting fact that nothing seems to justify [the hearsay rule]” and opining that a preferential 
rule requiring live testimony when it is possible is the “more sensible rule”); see also Weinstein, 
supra note 63, at 346 (noting that even Dean Wigmore advocated admitting hearsay of deceased 
declarants). 
 78. See Weinstein, supra note 63, at 339 (critiquing the categorical approach to hearsay at 
common law and opining, “Some faith must be reposed in triers to assess the evidence as 
‘responsible persons’ engaged in ‘serious affairs.’” (quoting NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 
F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1938))). 
 79. See id. at 346 (“In the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a small and 
lonely island.”); Myrna S. Raeder, Commentary, A Response to Professor Swift: The Hearsay 
Rule at Work: Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial Discretion?, 76 MINN. L. REV. 507, 
514–19 (1992) (arguing that the catchall exception to the hearsay rule has eroded the prohibition 
on hearsay evidence). 
 80. See, e.g., Morgan & Maguire, supra note 37, at 921 (describing the common law 
hearsay rule as “an old-fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by 
cubists, futurists and surrealists”); Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 6, at 1 (deriding 
the “quirky dysfunctionality” of the hearsay scheme).  
 81. See, e.g., CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 459, 627 (1st 
ed. 1954) (“[T]he values of hearsay declarations or writings, and the need for them, in particular 
situations cannot with any degree of realism be thus minutely ticketed in advance. . . . Too much 
worthless evidence will fit the categories, too much that is vitally needed will be left out.”); 
Friedman, supra note 76, at 552 (opining that “few lawyers are satisfied with the cracker-barrel 
psychology that underlies exceptions like the one for excited utterances”); Morgan, supra note 
50, at 38–47 (describing how much probative evidence the hearsay rule excludes and how much 
unreliable evidence of low probative value the categorical hearsay exceptions permit); Weinstein, 
supra note 63, at 339 (“[A] series of independent letters written by disinterested ministers who 
were eyewitnesses to an event and who are shown to have acute vision, sound memories, and 
clear powers of communication might well be given more weight than many dying declarations 
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This last criticism is the one prominently reiterated in the Seventh 
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Boyce.82 Concerns about baseless 
folk psychology underlying the hearsay exceptions prompted Judge 
Posner to propose a transition to a single hearsay exception that would 
allow trial judges to evaluate the reliability of hearsay statements on a 
case-by-case basis, unhindered by the categorical prescriptions in the 
Federal Rules.83 Although the hearsay rules embodied in the Federal 
Rules have been under nearly constant attack since their inception, Judge 
Posner’s recent concurrence in Boyce represents serious criticism from a 
distinguished quarter. Importantly, this is not Judge Posner’s first attack 
on the categorical hearsay model.84 Increasingly vocal opposition to the 
governing hearsay rules from a highly respected circuit judge and scholar 
threatens to erode public confidence in evidence standards and merits 
thoughtful consideration.85 
II.  THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN: UNITED STATES V. BOYCE 
The criticism of hearsay doctrine in United States v. Boyce is 
significant because it occurred in connection with a routine admission of 
hearsay evidence in a typical federal prosecution of a convicted felon for 
possession of a firearm.86 Notwithstanding the routine nature of the case, 
the majority opinion reached out for the opportunity to critique the 
present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. Judge Posner added a concurrence solely to emphasize that critique 
and to propose the repeal of the categorical hearsay exceptions. 
A.  The Case Against Boyce 
On March 27, 2010, officers responded to a 911 call from defendant 
Darnell Boyce’s girlfriend reporting a domestic battery in which Boyce 
                                                                                                                     
or implied admissions which may be made by a party having no knowledge of the event or may 
have been made many years before by a predecessor in interest who had every motive to lie.”).  
 82. 742 F.3d 792, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2014) (majority opinion). 
 83. Id. at 801–02 (Posner, J., concurring). 
 84. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“As with much 
of the folk psychology of evidence, it is difficult to take this rationale entirely seriously, since 
people are entirely capable of spontaneous lies in emotional circumstances. ‘Old and new studies 
agree that less than one second is required to fabricate a lie.’ It is time the law began paying 
attention to such studies.” (quoting Douglas D. McFarland, Present Sense Impressions Cannot 
Live in the Past, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 916 (2001))).  
 85. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensic Fallacies and a Famous Judge, 54 JURIMETRICS 211, 
212 (2014) (“Because Judge Posner’s views and analyses are likely to be influential, it is important 
to examine the arguments that he offers.”). 
 86. 742 F.3d at 793 (majority opinion). The government also prosecuted defendant Boyce 
for possession of ammunition. Id.  
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was purportedly “going crazy for no reason.”87 During that call, the 911 
operator asked whether Boyce had any weapons.88 In response to the 
operator’s questions, Boyce’s girlfriend reported that Boyce had a gun.89 
After officers arrived at the scene, they observed Boyce running away 
and pursued him.90 During the chase, officers saw Boyce throw a 
handgun over a garage and into a neighboring yard.91 After detaining 
Boyce, officers recovered a .357 Magnum handgun from the area where 
Boyce had thrown it and found ammunition for that handgun in Boyce’s 
pocket.92  
At trial, officers testified to their pursuit of Boyce, his attempt to 
dispose of the gun, and his possession of ammunition.93 Boyce’s 
girlfriend, who had reported the incident to the 911 operator, did not 
testify at trial.94 Instead, the district court permitted the government to 
play for the jury her hearsay statements to the 911 operator asserting that 
Boyce possessed a gun.95 The district court found that these hearsay 
statements were admissible as present sense impressions pursuant to Rule 
803(1) and as excited utterances pursuant to Rule 803(2).96 Boyce was 
convicted.97 
B.  The Seventh Circuit Opinion  
Following his conviction, Boyce appealed to the Seventh Circuit, 
claiming that the admission of the hearsay statements to the 911 operator 
was erroneous because those statements did not fit within the present 
sense impression exception or excited utterance exception to the hearsay 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. The 911 operator asked: “Any weapons involved?” to which Boyce’s girlfriend 
responded: “Yes.” Id. After the operator asked what kind of weapons were involved, Boyce’s 
girlfriend replied: “A gun.” Id. 
 90. Id. at 793–94. 
 91. Id. at 794. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. While Boyce was incarcerated awaiting trial, he wrote a letter to his girlfriend asking 
her to recant her statements about his possession of a gun and providing her with a “story” she 
should tell to explain the change in her testimony. Id. In his concurring opinion, Judge Posner 
notes that the government likely did not call Boyce’s girlfriend as a trial witness due to the strong 
probability that she would recant on the stand and that Boyce likely did not call her to testify 
because of the likelihood that reference to Boyce’s letter encouraging her to recant would lead to 
her impeachment. Id. at 800 (Posner, J., concurring).  
 95. Id. at 794 (majority opinion). 
 96. Id. at 796. 
 97. Id. 
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rule.98 In affirming Boyce’s conviction, a three-judge panel of the 
Seventh Circuit explored the requirements of the present sense 
impression and excited utterance exceptions, as well as the theoretical 
underpinnings of each.99  
The court noted that the present sense impression exception permits 
admission of statements “describing or explaining an event or condition, 
made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”100 As the 
court pointed out: “The theory underlying the present sense impression 
exception ‘is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement 
negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.’”101 
The excited utterance exception permits admission of statements 
“relating to a startling event” so long as the declarant made the statements 
“while . . . under the stress of excitement” caused by that startling 
event.102 As noted by the Seventh Circuit panel in Boyce, the philosophy 
underlying the excited utterance exception is that a condition of 
excitement “temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces 
utterances free of conscious fabrication.”103 
After articulating the rationales for both exceptions, the panel opinion 
proceeded to question the validity of both, referring to “the folk 
psychology of evidence” that is “difficult to take . . . seriously” and 
emphasizing the potentially distorting effects of shock and excitement on 
a declarant’s observations.104 These criticisms notwithstanding, the court 
recognized that both hearsay exceptions are “well-established” and 
proceeded to evaluate their applicability to the hearsay statements 
introduced at Boyce’s trial.105  
First, the court evaluated Boyce’s claim that the statements to the 911 
operator failed to satisfy the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
present sense impression exception because those statements described 
his conduct with “calculated narration.”106 Boyce argued that his 
girlfriend made the statements to the 911 operator with calculated 
narration because she only reported that he had a gun following questions 
                                                                                                                     
 98. Id. Boyce also challenged his felon in possession convictions by arguing that his civil 
rights had been restored. Id. at 794–95.  
 99. Id. at 796–97. 
 100. Id. at 796. 
 101. Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note). 
 102. FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 103. 742 F.3d at 796 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 104. Id. (quoting Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 797. 
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from the 911 operator about weapons.107 In considering this argument, 
the Seventh Circuit noted that a declarant may utter present sense 
impressions without calculated narration even in response to questions 
and emphasized that the 911 operator in Boyce’s case did not mention 
guns in questioning Boyce’s girlfriend.108 Still, the court declined to 
affirm the admission of the 911 statements on the basis of the present 
sense impression exception, acknowledging that answering questions 
could increase the chances of calculated narration.109  
The court held, however, that the 911 statements fit within the excited 
utterance exception and were thus properly admitted.110 The court found 
that the domestic battery reported to the 911 operator constituted a 
“startling event” for purposes of the excited utterance exception.111 The 
court also found ample evidence to suggest that Boyce’s girlfriend 
remained under the stress of that event at the time she spoke to the 911 
operator.112 Finally, the court rejected Boyce’s argument that the 
statement about his possession of a gun was unrelated to the domestic 
battery.113 The court found that the “level of danger posed by [the 
declarant’s] assailant” was undoubtedly related to the battery and within 
the broad subject matter permitted by the excited utterance exception.114 
Accordingly, the court upheld the admission of the 911 statements and 
affirmed Boyce’s conviction.115 
C.  Judge Posner’s Concurrence 
Judge Posner wrote separately, concurring in the panel’s decision.116 
Rather than expressing alternative rationales for the decision, Judge 
Posner penned a concurrence solely to “amplify” concerns about the 
present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay 
rule, opining that “there is profound doubt whether either should be an 
exception to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.”117  
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 797–98. 
 110. Id. at 798. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. (noting a police officer’s testimony that the declarant “appeared emotional, as 
though she had just been in an argument or fight”). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 798–99 (“[I]f a domestic battery victim . . . knows her assailant has access to a 
gun nearby, the potential for more lethal force to be used against her would be a subject likely to 
be evoked in the description of her assault.”). 
 115. Id. at 799. 
 116. Id. (Posner, J., concurring) (“I agree that the district court should be affirmed—and 
indeed I disagree with nothing in the court’s opinion.”). 
 117. Id. at 800. 
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First, Judge Posner noted that the ban on hearsay is designed largely 
to prevent admission of declarant statements that the opposing party 
cannot test by cross-examination.118 He emphasized that either the 
prosecution or defense could have called Boyce’s girlfriend to provide 
the first-hand testimony subject to cross-examination preferred in the 
American adversarial system.119 Judge Posner did not expressly criticize 
the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions for being 
applicable without regard to the declarant’s availability as a witness.120 
Still, this reference to the availability of Boyce’s girlfriend appears to be 
a strong, if rather obliquely made, suggestion that hearsay exceptions 
such as the present sense impression and excited utterance should not 
apply when the declarant can give live testimony at trial.  
Judge Posner continued by discrediting the rationales supporting the 
reliability of present sense impressions and excited utterances. First, 
Judge Posner questioned the assumption inherent in the present sense 
impression that contemporaneous observation and speech negates 
deliberate misrepresentation, pointing to studies suggesting that most lies 
are spontaneous rather than planned and that “less than one second is 
required to fabricate a lie.”121 Judge Posner concluded his discussion of 
the present sense impression exception by stating that it “has neither a 
theoretical nor an empirical basis; and it’s not even common sense—it’s 
not even good folk psychology.”122 
Judge Posner expressed similar disdain for the excited utterance 
exception, noting that even the advisory committee notes supporting the 
exception are equivocal with respect to the effect of excitement upon 
fabrication.123 Even assuming that the excitement produced by a startling 
event minimizes self-interest and reflection, Judge Posner highlighted 
scholarship questioning whether the “distorting effect of shock” might 
                                                                                                                     
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. (“But in this case, either party could have called [Boyce’s girlfriend] to testify, and 
her testimony would not have been hearsay.”). 
 120. See id. at 799–802. 
 121. Id. at 800–01 (citing McFarland, supra note 84, at 916; Monica T. Whitty et al., Not All 
Lies Are Spontaneous: An Examination of Deception Across Different Modes of Communication, 
63 J. AM. SOC’Y INFO. SCI. & TECH. 208, 208–09, 214 (2012)). The judge also noted judicial 
opinions broadly interpreting the timing requirement of the present sense impression to 
encompass “periods as long as 23 minutes.” Id. 
 122. Id. at 801. Although Judge Posner cited scholarly criticism of the present sense 
impression in his concurrence, recent scholarship has emphasized the value of contemporaneous 
hearsay in our technology-driven culture. See Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 15 (proposing a new 
hearsay exception to broaden admissibility of contemporaneously recorded hearsay statements).  
 123. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 801 (emphasizing that the advisory committee notes provide only 
that excitement “may produce . . . utterances free of conscious fabrication” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 
803(2) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rule)). 
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undermine the reliability of excited utterances.124 According to Judge 
Posner, once stripped of their purported justifications, the present sense 
impression and excited utterance exceptions are nothing more than 
“judicial habit, in turn reflecting judicial incuriosity and reluctance to 
reconsider ancient dogmas.”125  
Following this scathing indictment of the present sense impression 
and excited utterance exceptions, Judge Posner offered his vision for 
improving contemporary hearsay doctrine. In so doing, Judge Posner was 
clear that he does not favor reducing the amount of hearsay admissible in 
federal trials.126 Rather, Judge Posner opined that trials would proceed 
more smoothly with a “simpler” and more principled approach to the 
admission of hearsay than the one embodied in the existing Federal Rules 
framework.127 Dissatisfied with the theoretical underpinnings of the 
existing hearsay categories, Judge Posner posited a test for the 
admissibility of hearsay that he suggests rests on more rational 
foundations free from suspect folk psychology. Judge Posner suggested 
that allowing the existing “residual” or catchall exception to swallow the 
remainder of the hearsay provisions in Article Eight of the Federal Rules 
would constitute a superior and workable approach to hearsay 
evidence.128 Specifically, Judge Posner favors a tripartite inquiry that 
would admit hearsay evidence whenever a trial judge finds that (1) it is 
“reliable” hearsay, (2) the jury can “understand its strengths and 
limitations,” and (3) it will “materially enhance the likelihood of a correct 
outcome.”129  
III.  THE POSNER PROPOSAL DECONSTRUCTED  
Few, if any, would argue that the existing categorical system of 
hearsay exceptions is perfect. Indeed, many would likely agree with the 
criticisms levied against the present sense impression and excited 
                                                                                                                     
 124. Id. (citing, among others, Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the 
Rule Against Hearsay: Origin and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869 (1981)). 
 125. Id. at 802. Under the Federal Rules framework, it is difficult to attribute continued 
application of these hearsay exceptions to “judicial incuriosity.” Judges lack the authority to 
exclude relevant evidence admissible under the Federal Rules. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A 
Brief Defense of the Supreme Court’s Approach to the Interpretation of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 27 IND. L. REV. 267, 281 (1993) (noting that judicial power under the Federal Rules 
“does not equate with the common-law power to create general exclusionary rules of evidence”). 
 126. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802 (“I don’t want to leave the impression that in questioning the 
present sense and excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule I want to reduce the amount of 
hearsay evidence admissible in federal trials.”). 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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utterance exceptions in the Boyce opinion.130 Further, similar folk 
psychology underscores several hearsay exceptions in the Federal Rules. 
Statements made for purposes of medical treatment that are pertinent to 
such treatment are likely reliable because who would lie to a doctor?131 
Similarly, statements made with a settled, hopeless expectation of 
impending death concerning the cause or circumstances of that death are 
likely reliable because the declarant would not meet his maker with a lie 
on his lips.132 Indeed, the folk psychology lamented by Judge Posner in 
Boyce is the cornerstone of several contemporary hearsay exceptions.  
While it is natural and important to critique existing doctrine, it is 
impossible to evaluate the merits of the hearsay system in a vacuum by 
virtue of its shortcomings alone. Although the demerits of the existing 
categorical hearsay system are amply highlighted in Boyce, the merits of 
Judge Posner’s alternative hearsay regime remain unexplored in the 
opinion. To condemn the hearsay regime contained in the Federal Rules 
in favor of Judge Posner’s alternative, it is critical to evaluate the 
ramifications of accepting Posnerian hearsay. Even assuming that Judge 
Posner’s criticisms of contemporary hearsay exceptions are well-taken, 
examination of Judge Posner’s three-pronged alternative reveals that it is 
inferior to the existing hearsay regime from the standpoint of litigation 
economics and justice. Furthermore, adopting the tripartite approach 
suggested in the Boyce concurrence would be unlikely to create 
meaningful substantive change in hearsay policy notwithstanding a 
corresponding decrease in efficiency. 
A.  The Economics of Posnerian Hearsay: Measuring the Cost 
A likely casualty of adopting a generic reliability approach to hearsay 
would be litigation efficiency and valuation. The case-by-case hearsay 
model suggested in Boyce undoubtedly would result in an increased 
expenditure of judicial and litigant resources to ascertain the admissibility 
of key hearsay evidence and the corresponding value of a case. At a time 
when mounting costs are diminishing the viability of the trial process as 
                                                                                                                     
 130. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 76, at 552.  
 131. See FED. R. EVID. 803(4). The hearsay exception found in Rule 803(4) is, of course, 
broader than that description implies. The declarant does not need to make the statement to a 
doctor, and the declarant does not have to be a patient—the individual with the strongest incentive 
to receive appropriate treatment. Further, an amendment to the exception permits statements made 
for purposes of “diagnosis” only. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:75, at 676–
77. 
 132. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); see also 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:124, 
at 132 n.1.  
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a vehicle for dispute resolution, evidentiary reforms that promise to 
increase transaction costs should be cause for concern.133  
In litigation, some of the principal assets and liabilities come in the 
form of evidence admissible at trial to prove one’s position. Judge 
Posner’s discretionary approach to hearsay evidence would require 
litigation investors to “buy” into a litigation strategy by filing or 
defending a lawsuit, although they would learn the true worth of the 
investment only after the purchase. On the criminal side, such a regime 
may result in fewer plea bargains with defendants and prosecutors 
overestimating the strength of a case. On the civil side, early settlements 
may be eschewed in favor of summary judgment practice designed to 
ascertain the admissibility of trial evidence.134 In both civil and criminal 
cases, trial judges likely would face increased motions in limine to gauge 
the admissibility of hearsay pretrial and would need to resort to time-
consuming, case-specific reliability analysis to admit hearsay rather than 
relying upon accepted categorical hearsay exceptions.135 In sum, the 
Posner approach would decrease the information litigants have to value 
their cases and increase the resources consumed in administering hearsay 
doctrine.  
In contrast, the categorical hearsay regime embodied in the Federal 
Rules provides potential litigants greater predictability about the 
admissibility of crucial hearsay evidence. To be sure, it is not possible to 
make admissibility predictions with perfect precision because even the 
categorical hearsay exceptions permit the bridled exercise of judicial 
discretion.136 Within the categorical regime, hearsay exceptions contain 
interpretive issues that may make some ex ante assessments difficult. For 
example, the present sense impression exception requires the hearsay 
statement to follow the declarant’s observation of the described events 
“immediately,” thus requiring judges to evaluate timing on a case-by-case 
basis.137 As Judge Posner aptly notes in Boyce, some disparity exists 
                                                                                                                     
 133. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters 
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 461 (2004) (noting a sixty percent 
decline in trials since the mid-1980s). 
 134. See Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 8, at 1326 (opining that “given ever-
expanding dockets and increasing reliance on settlements and guilty pleas,” the objections to the 
discretionary model proposed by Judge Posner “have gained strength since 1969”).  
 135. See Weinstein, supra note 63, at 338 (advocating for discretionary treatment of hearsay, 
while acknowledging the increased burden on trial judges).  
 136. See infra notes 220–21 and accompanying text (discussing trial judge interpretation of 
categorical exceptions). 
 137. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (requiring that the declarant make statements describing an event 
or condition either as the declarant observes that event or condition “or immediately after”). 
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among judicial interpretations of this crucial timing requirement.138 Even 
under the current hearsay regime, litigants may need to seek a judicial 
ruling on hearsay evidence outside the core definition of each exception. 
Still, the highly specific hearsay exceptions and the many federal cases 
interpreting them make advance judgments about the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence far more predictable than the open-ended discretionary 
approach espoused in Judge Posner’s Boyce concurrence.139 Therefore, at 
the earliest stages of a dispute, participants in the trial process have access 
to material information central to the valuation of a case. A litigant who 
can readily measure access to key evidence can make rational and 
informed judgments about the expenditure of litigation resources.140  
For example, consider a potential plaintiff evaluating whether to sue 
a car manufacturer following a serious accident that only the plaintiff and 
the driver of another vehicle involved in the same accident observed. 
Suppose that the driver of the other vehicle made a statement to an 
insurance investigator weeks after the accident in which the driver denied 
fault and claimed that the plaintiff’s car swerved into his without warning. 
Suppose also that the driver was deceased by the time the potential 
plaintiff considered filing suit and that plaintiff wished to use the hearsay 
statement to describe the accident and to support her theory that a 
manufacturing defect in the car caused her to swerve suddenly. This 
potential plaintiff evaluating her case under the existing categorical 
hearsay rules likely would conclude that the driver’s statement would not 
constitute admissible evidence available for use at the summary judgment 
or trial stage of a lawsuit against the car manufacturer because it satisfies 
none of the specific hearsay exceptions identified in the Federal Rules 
and appears to be an unlikely candidate for the residual exception.141 
Thus, this potential plaintiff would evaluate the merits of her case absent 
this hearsay statement. Knowing in advance that the driver’s hearsay 
                                                                                                                     
 138. 742 F.3d 792, 800 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing cases allowing time lapses of sixteen and 
twenty-three minutes between the described event and the hearsay statement). 
 139. See Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary, supra note 18, at 1371 (noting that within 
the Federal Rules, a litigator “will find a rule providing an answer to the clear majority of 
evidentiary questions that arise in federal court”).  
 140. See Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 15, at 26. 
 141. Although the Federal Rules preserve important flexibility for admitting hearsay not 
within a defined hearsay exception, such a self-serving statement by an interested party in 
response to questioning by an investigator that the party did not make in excitement or 
contemporaneously would be unlikely to qualify for the residual exception. FED. R. EVID. 807 
(admitting hearsay that possesses “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” to 
those enjoyed by hearsay statements admissible through Rules 803 and 804); see Land v. Am. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 582 F. Supp. 1485, 1486 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (excluding a self-serving hearsay 
statement of an interested party under all traditional exceptions, as well as the residual exception 
to the hearsay rule). 
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statement will not be admissible may affect the plaintiff’s decision to 
bring suit at all, depending upon the availability of other evidence to 
support her theory of the case. Similarly, the ability to assess 
admissibility in advance could impact settlement valuation of the case, 
persuading the potential plaintiff to accept a settlement from the car 
manufacturer early in the proceedings rather than pursuing the case to the 
summary judgment or trial stage without the helpful hearsay account of 
the accident.142  
Conversely, under the discretionary case-by-case approach to hearsay 
proposed by Judge Posner in Boyce, the same hypothetical plaintiff may 
expend significant resources pursuing a case against the car manufacturer 
in the hopes that the trial judge will admit the hearsay statement of the 
deceased driver to corroborate her account of the accident. The plaintiff’s 
counsel may conclude that he can make a credible argument that a 
hearsay statement by the only other eyewitness made in the weeks 
following the accident is reliable, capable of valuation by the jury, and 
likely to lead to a correct outcome, especially in the absence of other 
evidence describing the accident.143 The plaintiff may not only bring a 
lawsuit, but may also decline to settle the case until the summary 
judgment or even the trial stage when she is able to obtain a definitive 
ruling from the judge about the admissibility of the hearsay statement.144 
Faced with a hearsay objection to the driver’s statement at such a late 
stage in the litigation process, a trial judge could find it lacking in the 
necessary reliability as a self-serving statement of an interested party 
made after ample time to reflect and in the context of an insurance 
investigation creating a strong motive to fabricate. Absent the car 
manufacturer’s ability to cross-examine the driver, a judge could exclude 
the statement. Because of the uncertainty inherent in the Posner approach 
to hearsay analysis, the plaintiff may arrive at a valuation of her case at 
this late stage in the litigation process that approximates the valuation she 
would have made prior to filing suit under the Federal Rules.145 A 
settlement at such a late stage for the same amount that the parties would 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary, supra note 18, at 1374 (“In part, the value 
of the case is determined by the admissibility of the respective parties’ best evidence. To the extent 
that it is difficult for the parties to evaluate the admissibility of the crucial items of evidence, it 
will be harder for them to reach common ground as to the settlement value of the case.”).  
 143. See Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802 (proposing these three factors for admissibility of hearsay 
evidence). 
 144. See Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary, supra note 18, at 1374 (“If the litigator 
cannot identify the rule determining the admissibility of the vital evidentiary items, he or she must 
guess as to settlement value.”).  
 145. Id. (“To the extent that it is difficult for the parties to evaluate the admissibility of the 
crucial items of evidence, it will be harder for them to reach common ground as to the settlement 
value of the case.”).  
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have agreed upon earlier under the Federal Rules represents a net loss of 
litigant and judicial resources.146  
To be sure, it may be an unusual case that hinges on a single piece of 
hearsay evidence. Numerous hearsay statements could be at issue in any 
given federal case; however, the totality of which could be significant in 
terms of the likely outcome.147 Evaluating the potential admissibility of 
each hearsay statement through the lens of a flexible reliability standard 
is likely to create significant uncertainty as to the hearsay evidence that 
ultimately will be available at trial. This collective uncertainty promises 
to impede effective case valuation as illustrated with the single hearsay 
statement in the example above. At a time when efforts to reform 
litigation are focused on decreasing the mounting costs of the trial 
process, alteration of the evidence rules in a manner that taxes litigant and 
judicial resources is ill-advised.148  
B.  Reliability Is in the Eye of the Beholder 
Case-by-case determinations about the admissibility of hearsay would 
do more than deprive litigants of crucial ex ante information needed to 
evaluate the likelihood of success at trial. Such a flexible standard also 
would eliminate any meaningful governor on a trial judge’s decision to 
admit or exclude hearsay evidence in any given case. A standard 
embodying such unbridled flexibility is certain to generate greater 
inconsistency in admissibility decisions and unfairness to litigants whose 
fortunes may turn on the assignment of a particular trial judge rather than 
on the strength of their positions.149 Deferential appellate review of such 
discretionary decisions based upon context-specific reliability offers little 
promise of correcting inconsistencies.  
Judge Posner’s proposed reform would require a trial judge to 
evaluate the reliability of particular hearsay statements at trial without the 
limitations of standardized categories of admissible hearsay.150 In 
sympathetic, compelling, or politically charged cases, for example, trial 
                                                                                                                     
 146. See Weinstein, supra note 63, at 338 (acknowledging the increased burden on trial 
judges in administering a discretionary hearsay regime).  
 147. Swift, supra note 30, at 2476 (noting the increased importance of hearsay evidence in 
drug and gang related prosecutions). 
 148. See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
supra note 17. 
 149. See Swift, supra note 30, at 2446–47 (describing “fears that discretionary power will be 
exercised arbitrarily and unfairly; that broad and ambiguous principles make evidentiary rulings 
unpredictable to parties preparing for trial and result in inconsistent outcomes; and that the 
perceived unfairness of inconsistent outcomes, or outcomes dependent on the personality of the 
judge one happens to draw, could lead to a loss of confidence in the judicial system”).  
 150. See Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 6, at 29–30 (describing the Canadian 
system and the similar ad hoc reliability standard applicable there).  
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judges would experience inevitable pressure to admit hearsay evidence 
“needed” to support a case.151 Without standardized hearsay exceptions 
limiting the trial court’s discretion, a flexible reliability test could easily 
be manipulated to permit admission of hearsay in almost any case. This 
could result in some litigants in the federal system having greater access 
to evidence than other litigants facing different trial judges in less 
compelling cases. Importantly, it would also mean that opponents of 
hearsay evidence would enjoy less meaningful protection against the 
admission of hearsay evidence, thus eroding the hearsay prohibition in 
Rule 802. While much scholarship has emphasized the potential benefits 
of broadening the admissibility of hearsay evidence, any such revision to 
the existing hearsay regime should broaden admissibility expressly and 
evenly, rather than leading litigants to rely upon a continued hearsay 
“prohibition” of questionable value.  
Judge Posner’s proposed tripartite standard acknowledges the role that 
a judge’s assessment of the merits of a case must play in administering a 
flexible reliability approach to hearsay. Judge Posner’s test would instruct 
trial judges to admit reliable hearsay evidence when it “would materially 
enhance the likelihood of a correct outcome.”152 Presumably, a trial judge 
following this standard should be more inclined to admit hearsay 
evidence if she determines that the proponent of the hearsay has the better 
case. Such a standard for the admission of evidence could transform 
judicial assessments about “correct” outcomes into dangerous self-
fulfilling prophecies. The better the judge’s assessment of the merits of a 
litigant’s position, the more evidence that litigant is likely to have at his 
disposal. Rather than the narrow judgment focused on the attributes of a 
particular piece of evidence required by the existing categorical hearsay 
exceptions, such a flexible approach to hearsay invites a trial judge to 
prejudge the entire case as a precondition to admitting hearsay 
evidence.153 While perhaps an unavoidable phenomenon in a system 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See Avani Mehta Sood, Cognitive Cleansing: Experimental Psychology and the 
Exclusionary Rule, 103 GEO. L.J. 1543, 1546–48 (2015) (describing a “motivated justice 
hypothesis” positing that “when the general commitment that judges and jurors have to following 
legal rules clashes with their own sense of justice in a given case, they may inadvertently perceive, 
interpret, or construct the circumstances of the case in a manner that enables them to achieve their 
desired outcome ostensibly within the stated parameters of the law”). 
 152. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 153. See Swift, supra note 30, at 2465 (“When judges use such a discretionary standard in 
admitting hearsay, primarily substituting the court’s estimates of the hearsay declarant’s 
trustworthiness for categorical ‘fit,’ categorical constraints disappear. This raises the spectra of 
the outright evaluation of credibility by judges on a case-by-case basis, inconsistency in outcomes, 
and potential for unfairness.”). Perhaps Judge Posner intended only to emphasize the importance 
of reliability with this reference to “correct outcomes.” Still, this additional component of the 
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administered by human beings, evidence rules ought to be designed to 
diminish the impact of such judicial evaluations, leaving the crucial task 
of deciding the case to the fact finder.154  
Of course, the residual or catchall hearsay exception currently 
embodied in Rule 807 already vests federal trial judges with discretion to 
admit hearsay statements that do not satisfy the categorical exceptions–
and even counsels judges to admit hearsay evidence when doing so will 
advance the “interests of justice.”155 Still, Rule 807 guides a trial judge’s 
exercise of discretion by allowing the admission of hearsay only when 
that hearsay exhibits “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” 
“equivalent” to hearsay statements falling within the categorical 
exceptions.156 This flexibility permitted in the current hearsay system by 
the residual exception, however, does not present the same risk of 
inconsistency and injustice that a lone reliability standard poses.157  
First, a trial judge’s exercise of discretion under the residual exception 
is cabined by reference to the categorical exceptions. In theory, a hearsay 
statement should be admitted through Rule 807 only if its trustworthiness 
equals that of a statement admissible through other established 
exceptions.158 Thus, the language of the rule suggests a comparative 
exercise, requiring a trial judge to assess how a proffered hearsay 
statement stacks up against statements routinely admitted through other 
exceptions.159 Judge Posner has suggested doing away with the 
categorical exceptions, thus eliminating these important benchmarks for 
judicial consideration.160 Rule 807 further restricts the admissibility of 
hearsay through the residual exception by requiring hearsay statements 
as “evidence of a material fact” and that are “more probative … than any 
other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable 
                                                                                                                     
Posner proposal is capable of great mischief if trial judges can assess hearsay evidence on a purely 
discretionary basis. 
 154. Id. at 2440 (cautioning “against the seemingly inexorable trend toward the expansion 
of [judicial] discretion”).  
 155. FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 5 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:140, at 273 (“[T]he catchall comes to 
us with conditions devised by Congress . . . which are designed to make it less accessible in 
practice, and to signal that the catchall is to be ‘used very rarely, and only in exceptional 
circumstances.’”). 
 158. FED. R. EVID. 807(a)(1). 
 159. See id. Although this comparative exercise does provide important benchmarks for 
judicial consideration, it too may undermine the categorical exceptions to some degree. See, e.g., 
United States v. Valdez-Soto, 31 F.3d 1467, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing 
contemporaneity of hearsay, declarant motivations, and declarant availability for cross-
examination in affirming admission of unsworn prior inconsistent statements through the catchall 
exception).  
 160. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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efforts.”161 The message of Rule 807 comes through loud and clear: It is 
only to be used sparingly when there is a high degree of both reliability 
and necessity.162  
Notwithstanding the design and intent of Rule 807 to limit the use of 
the residual exception, scholars have suggested that judges have abused 
the flexibility permitted by the residual exception in compelling cases.163 
If the limited discretion vested in trial judges through the residual 
exception has indeed opened the door for increasingly expansive 
admission of hearsay evidence and decreased predictability, litigants may 
expect that Judge Posner’s wide-open reliability approach will serve to 
exacerbate the problem. Because the catchall or residual exception would 
be the only hearsay exception under the Posnerian version of hearsay 
doctrine, judges could not apply it with caution. Judge Posner proposed 
essentially a simplification of Rule 807, which would pave the way for 
hearsay evidence of any stripe so long as it satisfied the trial judge’s 
notions of trustworthiness. Therefore, adopting the Posner approach 
would not represent a mere continuation of flexibility already inherent in 
the Federal Rules, but a significant expansion of judicial discretion with 
respect to the admission of hearsay evidence.  
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Crawford v. Washington 
in 2004 highlighted the dangers inherent in a flexible reliability standard 
for the admission of hearsay evidence.164 That decision redefined the 
promise of the Confrontation Clause for criminal defendants faced with 
hearsay evidence.165 In articulating a Sixth Amendment standard 
dependent upon the “testimonial” nature of hearsay statements, the Court 
rejected the long-standing test established decades earlier in Ohio v. 
Roberts.166 Essentially, Roberts permitted judges to admit hearsay 
statements against a criminal defendant consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment if those hearsay statements enjoyed “adequate indicia of 
reliability.”167 The chief reason for Crawford’s rejection of Roberts was 
                                                                                                                     
 161. FED. R. EVID. 807(a). 
 162. See Swift, supra note 30, at 2464 (pointing out that the advisory committee sought to 
limit the use of the residual exception to “‘exceptional cases’ where the hearsay had a high degree 
of both probativeness and necessity”).  
 163. See Raeder, supra note 79, at 514–19 (opining that judicial resort to the catchall 
exception is eroding the hearsay prohibition); Seigel, supra note 9, at 895 (“[C]ourts are resorting 
to the residual exceptions on an increasingly routine basis in ways clearly not contemplated by 
Congress.”).  
 164. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 165. See id. at 40. 
 166. See id. at 66–68 (highlighting Roberts’ flaws and declining to apply it); see also 
Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 413 (2007) (noting that Crawford overruled Roberts). 
 167. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 (“Roberts says that an unavailable witness’s out-of-court 
statement may be admitted so long as it has adequate indicia of reliability—i.e., falls within a 
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the nature of the confrontation right as a procedural one, incapable of 
being satisfied by anything other than the promised cross-examination 
process when “testimonial” hearsay statements are at issue.168 
Another important reason explored by the Court for rejecting the long-
standing Roberts doctrine was the malleability of a reliability standard for 
the admission of hearsay.169 The Court noted that “[r]eliability is an 
amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept” that turns on “which 
factors the judge considers and how much weight he accords each of 
them.”170 Importantly, the Court noted that judges often attach 
significance to “opposite facts” in assessing the reliability of a hearsay 
statement.171 Among many examples, the Court highlighted that the 
Colorado Supreme Court found a hearsay statement reliable in one case 
because the declarant made it “immediately after” the events in question, 
while it found a statement reliable in another case precisely because “two 
years had elapsed” between the events at issue and the hearsay 
statement.172 Indeed, the Court described the Crawford case as a “self-
contained demonstration” of the “unpredictable and inconsistent 
application” of the Roberts reliability standard.173 The Court pointed out 
that the trial court, intermediate appellate court, and highest state court in 
the Crawford proceedings all focused on different factors surrounding the 
challenged hearsay statements in reaching differing and sometimes 
opposite conclusions about reliability.174  
The overhaul of hearsay suggested by Judge Posner would involve a 
case-by-case assessment of the reliability of particular hearsay statements 
very similar to the Sixth Amendment framework that ruled the day under 
Roberts. It is inconceivable that capable and creative counsel will have 
difficulty identifying motivational and circumstantial factors weighing 
for or against the reliability of particular hearsay statements. Further, 
experienced trial judges could easily articulate reasons for the reliability 
of almost any hearsay statement, reviewable on appeal only for abuse of 
discretion.175 Such a flexible system would afford inadequate protection 
                                                                                                                     
‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” 
(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980))).  
 168. Id. at 61 (explaining that the Confrontation Clause “commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination”). 
 169. Id. at 63. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 66. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997) (“We have held that abuse of 
discretion is the proper standard of review of a district court's evidentiary rulings.”). 
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and predictability for litigants. As with Sixth Amendment analysis 
pursuant to Roberts, a rules-based approach to hearsay dependent on 
amorphous notions of reliability would be driven by those of a multitude 
of factors a particular judge emphasizes in the analysis. This remade 
hearsay system would likely produce inconsistent outcomes based upon 
contradictory factors, such as those described in Crawford. Of course, the 
Sixth Amendment Crawford standard would continue to protect criminal 
defendants from a malleable rules-based standard where testimonial 
hearsay is at issue.176 Even outside the confrontation context, however, 
similar fairness concerns remain about using an approach to hearsay 
evidence that is so inherently subjective. The Federal Rules are designed 
to achieve accurate and fair fact-finding across all cases.177 Based upon 
the amorphous and malleable nature of a reliability approach to hearsay, 
Posnerian hearsay would extract a significant price to be paid in fairness.  
C.  The Futility of It All 
Adopting the Posner approach threatens to transform the Federal 
Rules’ categorical “Code” governing hearsay evidence into a general 
“creed,” blessing the admission of all reliable hearsay statements.178 As 
detailed above, the price of adopting such an approach may be significant 
in terms of both resources and justice. From an economic perspective, 
however, the steep cost associated with any strategy alone reveals little 
about its fundamental merit. Indeed, viewing the costs associated with a 
change detached from any corresponding benefits is a meaningless 
exercise. To truly evaluate the merits of Posnerian hearsay, the benefits 
that it promises to deliver must be factored into the equation.  
According to Judge Posner’s concurrence in Boyce, eliminating 
hearsay exceptions such as the present sense impression and the excited 
utterance exceptions would remove arbitrary and irrational hearsay 
categories from the evidence rules.179 Judge Posner suggests that these 
hearsay exceptions lack any “theoretical” or “empirical” basis and are 
unsupported even by “common sense.”180 Dispensing with categorical 
hearsay exceptions, some of which are founded upon similar 
                                                                                                                     
 176. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (decoupling the Sixth Amendment standard from evidence 
rules) (“[W]e do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence . . . .”). 
 177. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules should be construed so as to administer every 
proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay, and promote the development of 
evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination.”). 
 178. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 179. 742 F.3d 792, 800–01 (7th Cir. 2014) (criticizing rationales for present sense impression 
and excited utterance exceptions); see also Seigel, supra note 9, at 898 (characterizing hearsay 
reform as “urgent” and decrying “the cynicism and contempt for law that is fostered by the firm 
entrenchment of wholly irrational doctrine at a critical place in legal education and practice”). 
 180. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 800–01. 
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psychological assumptions, would therefore free the evidence rules from 
such irrational and arbitrary standards and permit a more particularized 
assessment of hearsay evidence. A more rational approach to hearsay 
devoid of bad folk psychology certainly sounds like a laudable goal. 
Indeed, few would argue in favor of the perpetuation of arbitrary and 
unsupported evidence rules. In sum, the purported benefit of eliminating 
suspect hearsay exceptions would be a rational and supportable approach 
to the admission of hearsay evidence. 
But, what would replace those arbitrary categorical hearsay 
exceptions? Pursuant to the Posner approach, eliminating arbitrary 
exceptions would pave the way for a more rational and particularized 
judicial assessment of the genuine reliability of every specific hearsay 
statement offered at trial.181 Rather than basing the admission of hearsay 
evidence on unsupported assumptions regarding “generic” human 
behavior, the discretionary model would require targeted assessments 
about the reliability of specific declarants in crystallized factual 
contexts.182 To be sure, arguments that individualized treatment is 
superior to a one-size-fits-all approach resonate in many contexts. In the 
education arena, for example, who would argue that generic treatment of 
all students based upon assumptions about general learning style is 
superior to individualized instruction based upon the strengths and 
weaknesses of a particular student? 
Apart from the issue of the resources required to administer an 
individualized system, Judge Posner’s case-specific standard creates a 
new problem. How should a trial judge determine the reliability of 
particular hearsay statements made by specific declarants? What factors 
should a trial judge consider in deciding whether a specific declarant’s 
hearsay statement was reliable or unreliable? Presumably, all judges 
would take the context of the statement into account by considering the 
following questions: What were the circumstances surrounding the 
statement? What role did the declarant play in any underlying events? 
When did the declarant make the statement in relation to underlying 
events? What motivations was the declarant likely to have had at that 
time?  
The problem with replacing the hearsay exceptions with a reliability 
test to avoid folk psychology is that human nature and psychology are the 
only tools available to assess the reliability of hearsay statements uttered 
                                                                                                                     
 181. See 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 1.2, at 11–12 (“[T]here are strong 
views as well that trial courts can do better without rules, and need broad discretion to reach wise 
results. Nowhere was the difference between these views more visible than in the gestation of the 
catchall exceptions.”). 
 182. Weinstein, supra note 63, at 337 (“Wigmore’s rationale . . . makes admissible a class 
of hearsay rather than particular hearsay for which, in the circumstances of the case, there is need 
and assurance of reliability.” (emphasis added)). 
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by human declarants in a variety of situations. While a case-by-case 
assessment of reliability may particularize the human psychology 
inherent in the existing hearsay rules by requiring reference to a specific 
declarant in a precise context, it cannot avoid assumptions about human 
psychology. What assurance would litigants have that the particular 
psychological assumptions employed by the trial judge in assessing 
reliability are more reasoned and supportable than those embodied in the 
categorical hearsay exceptions?  
Further, a discretionary model would make the psychological 
assumptions creating trustworthiness less overt. For example, under a 
flexible reliability standard, a trial judge might find a hearsay statement 
such as the one admitted against the defendant in Boyce to be reliable for 
many reasons. The trial judge might conclude that the statement was 
reliable because the declarant had personal knowledge of her encounter 
with the defendant, and the declarant made her statements in the heat of 
the moment before she had time to consider the ramifications, as 
evidenced by her call to 911 and police observations of her demeanor at 
the scene. Thus, the same considerations used to admit the statement as 
an excited utterance under Rule 803(2) would be employed to admit the 
hearsay under a discretionary reliability standard. While litigants would 
be deprived of a predictable roadmap for the future admissibility of 
hearsay evidence, imperfect assumptions about human psychology would 
remain the foundation for specific decisions to admit or exclude such 
evidence.  
To be sure, predictability for litigants under a lone reliability standard 
would likely improve over time as particular judicial decisions began to 
coalesce around specific circumstances or attributes giving hearsay 
statements reliability. Indeed, this is precisely the common law evolution 
of hearsay that preceded the Federal Rules and from which the existing 
categorical exceptions were largely derived.183 It would be surprising if a 
transition to entirely judge-driven reliability analysis produced results 
vastly different from those achieved during the common law era. After a 
period of time during which federal trials operated under this simplified 
hearsay rule, the reliability analysis would likely converge around many 
of the existing categorical hearsay exceptions currently embodied in the 
Federal Rules.  
This final piece of the cost–benefit puzzle suggests that Judge 
Posner’s tempting invitation to simplify hearsay practice represents a bad 
bargain. The loss of specific hearsay exceptions would decrease the 
information litigants have available to value cases and predict trial 
outcomes. Such a decrease in ex ante information would require parties 
to expend already scarce litigation resources to ascertain the value of a 
                                                                                                                     
 183. See supra notes 32–36 and accompanying text.  
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particular case and the likelihood of success at trial. Likewise, trial judges 
would be forced to expend additional judicial resources ruling on pretrial 
motions seeking information about the likely admissibility of hearsay 
statements. A malleable case-by-case reliability standard also would 
create inconsistent application of hearsay doctrine across cases and 
courtrooms and could invite admissibility decisions based upon 
preconceived judicial assessments of correct outcomes. After paying this 
high price, the federal trial process would receive little in return. Human 
psychology would be inescapable, remaining embedded within 
particularized judicial assessments of reliability. Even more troubling, an 
experiment with discretionary treatment of hearsay would likely lead the 
trial process full circle, leaving the evidentiary system right where it 
started, with common law exceptions to the hearsay rule eerily 
reminiscent of the categorical exceptions in the Federal Rules. 
IV.  SLAYING THE DISCRETION DRAGON: A WAY FORWARD FOR 
HEARSAY DOCTRINE 
The costs inherent in a purely discretionary approach to hearsay 
should be familiar to the educated consumer of evidence law. The need 
for accessibility and pretrial clarity with respect to evidence standards 
drove the codification of evidence law in the first place.184 Furthermore, 
the optimal nature of hearsay rules was a topic of debate that arose during 
the original drafting of the Federal Rules.185 As described above, an early 
draft of the hearsay exceptions prepared by the advisory committee 
proposed a discretionary approach based upon the reliability of proffered 
hearsay, with contemporary exceptions listed as “illustrations.”186 After 
considering the advantages and disadvantages of an approach like the one 
advocated by Judge Posner, the advisory committee proposed the 
“prescriptive and limiting” categorical exceptions that make up the 
Federal Rules today.187  
Indeed, the downfall of Judge Posner’s concurrence in Boyce is not 
necessarily its criticism of existing hearsay exceptions. Rather, it is the 
suggested response to the flaws in existing hearsay doctrine: adoption of 
a hearsay “creed” that would tell trial judges to trust only their instincts 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Imwinkelried, The Golden Anniversary, supra note 18, at 1372–73 (describing 
challenges for trial lawyers in a pre-Rules universe and the findings of a preliminary report on the 
need for evidence rules).  
 185. See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (describing the debate over the 
appropriate nature of evidence rules). 
 186. See 4 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, § 8:66, at 561 (explaining that a 
preliminary draft of the hearsay rules took “an open approach to hearsay exceptions that 
emphasized the admissibility of reliable hearsay”). 
 187. Id.; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
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concerning reliability in evaluating hearsay evidence that the advisory 
committee rejected as unworkable after years of study.188 Even assuming 
the validity of Judge Posner’s critique of existing hearsay rules, the 
question becomes how to address shortcomings in certain categorical 
exceptions within the “Code” paradigm for evidence rules that has proved 
largely successful in addressing many of the flaws in the common law 
approach to evidence.189 A complete reversal of course to allow 
discretionary consideration of hearsay on a case-by-case basis fails to 
capitalize on the lessons learned in the Federal Rules era. Rather than 
throwing hands up in surrender, reformers should continue to explore 
opportunities to advance hearsay doctrine for the twenty-first century. 
A.  The Devil We Know: The Case for the Categorical Approach  
The most obvious path going forward is to continue riding the 
categorical hearsay horse that has brought evidence doctrine this far. The 
categorical approach to hearsay in the Federal Rules may represent the 
best hearsay compromise possible, even assuming the validity of Judge 
Posner’s criticisms of the present sense impression and excited utterance 
exceptions. Indeed, Judge Posner’s proposal to discard the categorical 
regime in favor of a purely discretionary approach may be the 
quintessential case of allowing the perfect to be the enemy of the good.  
Notwithstanding imperfect foundations for certain contemporary 
hearsay exceptions, it may be the height of inefficiency to attempt any 
significant overhaul of the well-established hearsay regime embodied in 
the Federal Rules. First, as discussed above, the existing hearsay 
exceptions provide a general, if not precise, roadmap of admissibility for 
litigants seeking to value cases and weigh alternatives to trial.190 While 
the hearsay compromise reached by the Federal Rules may suffer from 
defects of folk psychology, the system of highly specific hearsay 
exceptions defining admissibility by reference to particularized 
circumstances serves the critical informational role necessary to an 
efficient litigation market. While there is some question whether an 
excited utterance is truly reliable in all cases, lawyers often know one 
when they see it and can develop litigation strategy with a significant 
degree of clarity about the statement’s admissibility. Moreover, Judge 
                                                                                                                     
 188. See Sklansky, What Evidence, supra note 6, at 155 (“[I]nvocations of the past in 
evidence law and scholarship tend all too often to take the form of appeals to lost wisdom.”). 
 189. See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 28, at § PT1.04 (“[I]t is fair to state that the goals of 
codification—increased certainty as to what the rules are, predictability, efficiency, and 
uniformity of result—have been met in large part, but not completely.”).  
 190. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. But see Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 15, at 
25 (suggesting that existing exceptions provide too little certainty to litigants seeking to “forecast 
trial outcomes”).  
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Posner’s criticisms of the present sense impression and excited utterance 
exceptions are not attacks on a categorical approach to hearsay; rather, 
they represent attacks on specific categories accepted within that system.  
Admittedly, Judge Posner’s concerns regarding folk psychology may 
extend beyond the two hearsay exceptions analyzed in Boyce. Still, the 
over-breadth of Judge Posner’s proposed revision of hearsay doctrine 
illustrates its inefficiency. To counteract allegedly faulty psychological 
assumptions inherent in a few hearsay exceptions, Judge Posner suggests 
completely dismantling Article Eight of the Federal Rules.191 Although 
several of the hearsay exceptions rest on assumptions about human 
psychology, other important exemptions and exceptions to the hearsay 
prohibition in the Federal Rules do not. For example, admissions by party 
opponents are admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) in the interests of 
adversarial fairness, regardless of their inherent reliability.192 The former 
testimony of an unavailable declarant is admissible due to the need for 
the evidence as well as the cross-examination previously afforded to the 
opponent of the evidence.193 In a reform that allows the residual hearsay 
exception to swallow all others, litigants would also lose the 
predictability provided by these categories. 
A response more narrowly tailored to identifiable shortcomings in 
particular categorical hearsay exceptions is superior to a transformation 
that throws out the good with the bad. Working to reimagine or repudiate 
specific categorical exceptions that lack rational underpinnings may 
serve to resolve concerns about the modern hearsay regime without 
eliminating the needed predictability and efficiency created by a 
categorical model.  
B.  Hope Springs Eternal: Modernizing the Categorical Regime 
Notwithstanding the blind adherence to “dogma” and “judicial 
incuriosity” lamented in Boyce,194 there is reason to be optimistic about 
revisions to specific categorical exceptions that are not functioning 
effectively. First, there is an active advisory committee charged with 
monitoring the operation of the Federal Rules. The committee was 
                                                                                                                     
 191. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (“What I would like to see is 
Rule 807 (‘Residual Exception’) swallow much of Rules 801 through 806 . . . .”). 
 192. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee’s note.  
 193. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1) advisory committee’s note. Of course, previous cross-
examination aids reliability. Still, the hearsay exception is driven by the inability to obtain live 
testimony and the previous opportunity of the opponent to test the hearsay through examination 
of the declarant rather than by assumptions about the declarant’s motivations to give the previous 
statements. Id.  
 194. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 802. 
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reconstituted in 1993 to review and update the rules.195 Since that time, 
the committee has proactively monitored the operation of the Federal 
Rules to identify problem areas and to propose revisions.196 The advisory 
committee has collaborated with Congress to address litigation 
inefficiencies through amendments to the Federal Rules.197 Additionally, 
the advisory committee has engaged in long-term monitoring of federal 
decisions to evaluate the operation of the Federal Rules in the courts and 
to ascertain the need for modifications.198 The committee has also sought 
the input of scholars, judges, and practitioners in identifying the need for 
amendments to the Federal Rules.199 The advisory committee completed 
an ambitious “restyling” project to make the Federal Rules “more easily 
understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the 
rules.”200 This active oversight has led to numerous amendments to the 
Federal Rules, including changes to the categorical hearsay exceptions 
that are the source of Judge Posner’s concerns.201 Two recent examples 
demonstrate that incuriosity and blind adherence to dogma will not 
impede the modernization of the categorical hearsay exceptions. The 
advisory committee worked to amend and update the hearsay exceptions 
covering prior consistent witness statements and declarations against 
                                                                                                                     
 195. See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 28, at § PT1.05 (“In 1993, the Judicial Conference, 
responding to calls from Judges, scholars and practitioners, appointed a new Advisory Committee 
on the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); see also Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal 
Rules of Evidence After Sixteen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need 
for an Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of 
the Rules, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 862 (1992) (calling for a reconstituted advisory committee 
to oversee the Federal Rules). 
 196. 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, at x (“In their first twenty years (1975–
1995), the Rules changed hardly at all, but the pace of change has accelerated . . . . The acceleration 
reflects the coming in 1993 of the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee, which meets regularly 
and proposes changes to the Rules almost every year.”). But see Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik 
William Delker, A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678, 678 (2000) 
(lamenting the “hands-off approach adopted by the Evidence Advisory Committee”). 
 197. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 28, at 6 (noting amendments originating in Congress and 
generated by the Judicial Conference). 
 198. Memorandum from the Honorable William K. Sessions, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Evidence Rules, to the Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 
at 1, 3 (Nov. 15, 2014) [hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Rules 
AndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV11-2014.pdf (noting continued monitoring of Crawford v. Washington and its 
progeny, as well as case law concerning admission of personal electronic communications). 
 199. See id. at 2–3 (describing a symposium hosted by the advisory committee at which 
Professor Jeffrey Bellin proposed additional hearsay exceptions).  
 200. FED. R. EVID. 101 advisory committee’s note to the 2011 amendment; see 1 MUELLER 
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, at x (noting that the Restyling Project “changed the wording of 
nearly every provision” in the Federal Rules).  
 201. See 1 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 16, at x–xi (chronicling several recent 
amendments to the evidence rules, including to the categorical hearsay exceptions). 
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interest to resolve perceived irrationality within those long-standing 
categorical exceptions.202  
When the Federal Rules were enacted, Rule 804(b)(3) admitted 
hearsay declarations against penal interest made by unavailable 
declarants that were not admissible at common law.203 The common law 
dogma rejected such hearsay due to the concern that criminal defendants 
too easily could fabricate “confessions” to their own crimes by 
conveniently unavailable declarants.204 Because of the perceived strength 
of incentives to avoid criminal liability, rule makers recognized the 
irrationality of foreclosing access to hearsay statements that subject the 
speaker to criminal liability in a system based upon reliability.205 
Therefore, such statements against penal interest were included within 
the hearsay exception for declarations against interest. To resolve 
concerns about criminal defendants utilizing fabricated confessions, rule 
makers added a requirement of “corroborating circumstances that clearly 
indicate [the] trustworthiness” of hearsay statements against penal 
interest offered to exculpate the accused in a criminal case.206  
This requirement imposed a corroboration obligation on criminal 
defendants relying on declarations against penal interest, but no 
corresponding corroboration obligation on prosecutors relying on the 
same kinds of hearsay statements to implicate the accused.207 As 
prosecutorial reliance on declarations against penal interest increased, 
commentators, judges, and litigants became concerned with the 
anomalous one-way limitation on a criminal defendant’s access to 
                                                                                                                     
 202. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note on the 2010 amendment; FED. R. 
EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note on the 2014 amendment. In addition, the advisory 
committee is currently considering the amendment or abrogation of the “ancient documents” 
exception to the hearsay rule in response to durable electronically stored information. See 
Memorandum, supra note 198, at 2. 
 203. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note on proposed rule (noting the “refusal 
of the common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest” and extending the exception to 
hearsay statements exposing the declarant to criminal liability).  
 204. Id. (“[O]ne senses in the decisions a distrust of evidence of confessions by third persons 
offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either of the fact of the 
making of the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either instance by the required 
unavailability of the declarant.”). 
 205. Id. (“The refusal of the common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest was no 
doubt indefensible in logic . . . .”). 
 206. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (language prior to 2010 amendment); see FED. R. EVID. 
804(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rule (“The requirement of corroboration should 
be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.”). 
 207. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes on the 2010 amendment (noting 
that the text of the original rule did not apply the corroboration requirement to all declarations 
against penal interest).  
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exculpatory evidence.208 In light of the unforeseen and increasing use of 
declarations against penal interest by prosecutors, rule makers proposed 
and ultimately obtained an amendment to Rule 804(b)(3) to level the 
playing field. A 2010 amendment to the hearsay exception for 
declarations against interest added a corroboration obligation for 
prosecutors relying on declarations against penal interest to resolve the 
irrational and uneven application created by the original exception.209  
Even more recently, the advisory committee proposed an amendment 
to the hearsay exemption for prior consistent statements of testifying 
witnesses to resolve a seemingly irrational gap in the original rule.210 
Original Rule 801(d)(1)(B) permitted substantive use of “pre-motive” 
prior consistent witness statements that served to rebut a charge that the 
witness recently fabricated trial testimony or acted from a recent 
improper influence or motive in testifying.211 The advisory committee’s 
note to the original rule suggested that substantive treatment of a prior 
consistent statement was appropriate where the opponent of the statement 
opened the door to its admissibility with an impeaching attack, and where 
“no sound reason” existed to prevent its general use once admitted.212 In 
2013, the advisory committee proposed the expansion of Rule 
801(d)(1)(B), noting that prior witness consistencies admitted to rebut 
types of impeaching attacks, other than the motivational attack described 
in the original rule, would share the same attributes as those substantively 
admissible through the original exception.213 Thus, the omission of prior 
                                                                                                                     
 208. Id. (“A number of courts have applied the corroborating circumstances requirement to 
declarations against penal interest offered by the prosecution . . . .”). 
 209. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (requiring the support of “corroborating circumstances that 
clearly indicate [the] trustworthiness” of any declaration against penal interest offered “in a 
criminal case”); see FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes on the 2010 amendment 
(“A unitary approach to declarations against penal interest assures both the prosecution and the 
accused that the Rule will not be abused and that only reliable hearsay statements will be admitted 
under the exception.”).  
 210. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate, 
Bankruptcy, and Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Request for Comment 
217 (Aug. 2012), available at http://federalevidence.com/pdf/FRE_Amendments/2012Amendm 
ents/ACR.FRE-Pub-Comment8-2012.pdf. 
 211. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); see Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 155–56 (1995) 
(interpreting Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to cover “pre-motive” prior consistent statements only). 
 212. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s notes on proposed rule.  
 213. See Memorandum from Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, Chair, Advisory Comm. on 
Evidence Rules, to the Honorable Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice 
& Procedure, at 2 (May 7, 2013) [hereinafter May 7, 2013 Memorandum], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/EV05-2013.pdf (noting the 
“practical problems in distinguishing between substantive and credibility use” for “other 
rehabilitative statements . . . not admissible under the hearsay exemption”). 
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consistent witness statements admitted to repair other impeaching attacks 
from the original rule seemed like an irrational oversight.214 To address 
this perceived gap in the existing hearsay exemption, the advisory 
committee proposed and obtained an amendment to embrace these 
similarly situated prior consistent statements, notwithstanding some 
criticism from judges and lawyers resistant to alterations to the long-
standing and well-understood hearsay rule.215  
These two recent amendments to the hearsay exceptions reveal a 
realistic path for hearsay reform within the categorical regime. To the 
extent that judges, litigants, and commentators expose inadequacies in 
certain categorical exceptions, there is every reason to expect that the 
advisory committee will take those concerns seriously and consider 
proposals to address them. If the past twenty years is any indication, the 
advisory committee will not shy away from making needed reforms due 
to “incuriosity” or “reluctance to reconsider ancient dogmas.”216 
Further, there is an active scholarly community in the evidence arena 
studying the fair and effective operation of the Federal Rules. 
Commentators—almost too numerous to count—have opined regarding 
hearsay evidence and have devoted much contemporary scholarship to 
exploring specific hearsay exceptions within the categorical regime.217 
As previously noted, the advisory committee has monitored the 
scholarship and considered proposals for reform arising in the 
academy.218 With an active scholarly community engaged in debate 
concerning the specific categorical hearsay exceptions, irrational 
foundations and inadequate requirements underlying those exceptions are 
certain to be identified. Proposals for revision and repudiation will 
continue to be advanced and considered regularly.219  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 214. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note on the 2014 amendment. 
 215. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii) (allowing substantive use of prior consistent 
statements offered to “rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on 
another ground”); see also May 7, 2013 Memorandum, supra note 213 (noting that public 
comment on the proposal was “largely negative” but “sparse”). 
 216. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Like the exception for 
present sense impressions, the exception for excited utterances rests on no firmer ground than 
judicial habit, in turn reflecting judicial incuriosity and reluctance to reconsider ancient 
dogmas.”). 
 217. See, e.g., Bellin, eHearsay, supra note 15; Bellin, Facebook, Twitter, supra note 8; 
Imwinkelried, The Need to Resurrect, supra note 8; Richter, Case for Caution, supra note 15; 
Richter, Seeking Consistency, supra note 8. 
 218. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
 219. See Memorandum, supra note 198, at 5–6 (explaining that the advisory committee will 
continue monitoring the need for a recent perceptions exception to the hearsay rule).  
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C.  Judges Tend to Be Curious 
The categorical hearsay regime allows judges to play a critical role in 
ensuring the rationality and consistency of the hearsay exceptions. 
Notwithstanding legitimate concerns about the universality of the 
psychological assumptions underlying certain hearsay exceptions, those 
exceptions contain numerous requirements and limitations designed to 
exclude unreliable evidence. In particularized factual contexts where the 
generic psychological assumptions supporting a proffered hearsay 
exception appear suspect, trial judges may resort to the requirements and 
limitations in the exceptions themselves to exclude such evidence.  
For example, if an interested party attempted to offer his own self-
serving excited utterance of innocence made shortly after an accident, a 
judge could exclude the hearsay statement, notwithstanding the 
exception, by finding that the declarant exhibited inadequate signs of 
stress or excitement and that the statement appeared to be the product of 
conscious reflection rather than a spontaneous reaction to the accident.220 
Further, to exclude an anonymous hearsay statement purporting to 
describe a disputed event as the declarant perceived it, a trial judge could 
find inadequate evidence to establish the anonymous declarant’s personal 
knowledge and exclude the statement, notwithstanding the present sense 
impression exception.221 Indeed, Judge Posner imagined a hypothetical 
present sense impression in his Boyce concurrence that Rule 803(1) 
would likely exclude in similar fashion: 
Suppose I run into an acquaintance on the street and he has 
a new dog with him—a little yappy thing—and he asks me, 
“Isn’t he beautiful”? I answer yes, though I’m a cat person 
and consider his dog hideous.222 
Despite Judge Posner’s suggestion that his “lie” about his 
acquaintance’s dog could qualify for admission as a present sense 
impression, a federal trial judge applying Rule 803(1) would almost 
                                                                                                                     
 220. In fact, in an opinion penned by Judge Posner, a panel of the Seventh Circuit utilized 
such an analysis to reject the admissibility of self-serving memos offered to support a company’s 
purported nondiscriminatory rationale for denying plaintiff a promotion. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 
383 F.3d 580, 588 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Boulden was hardly under emotional pressure when he was 
writing these memos, and their length, lucidity, and self-congratulatory tone all refute any 
inference of spontaneity.”). 
 221. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
an anonymous note failed to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement of Rule 803(1)); Miller 
v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1985) (finding inadequate evidence of the declarant’s 
personal knowledge); People v. Brown, 610 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 1993) (allowing present sense 
impression by 911 caller “Henry” where responding officer found circumstances that matched 
Henry’s description).  
 222. 742 F.3d 792, 801 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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certainly exclude this statement. Responding “yes” to a question about 
the dog would be unlikely to count as a “description” or “explanation” of 
an “event or condition.”223 Here, the declarant is not explaining that the 
acquaintance has a dog or describing the dog (as little and yappy for 
example). Rather, the declarant simply answers “yes” to a question posed 
about the dog.224 Further, the fact that the declarant made the hearsay 
statement in response to a leading question could defeat the immediacy 
or lack of conscious reflection that is the foundation for the present sense 
impression exception.  
The Seventh Circuit has interpreted the present sense impression 
exception to require a description of an event or condition “without 
calculated narration.”225 The court analyzed the meaning of this 
“calculated narration” limitation in Boyce. The court opined that 
statements made in response to questions were not automatically 
disqualified as “calculated narrations” under the present sense impression 
exception.226 The court went on to emphasize that Boyce’s girlfriend 
made the hearsay statement accusing defendant Boyce of possessing a 
gun in response to “open-ended” questions by a 911 dispatcher about 
whether the declarant’s attacker had any weapons.227 However, the 
Seventh Circuit ultimately declined to affirm the admission of the hearsay 
statement against Boyce on the basis of the present sense impression 
exception simply because “answering questions rather than giving a 
spontaneous narration could increase the chances that the statements were 
made with calculated narration.”228  
This analysis strongly suggests that the Seventh Circuit would exclude 
a statement given in response to such a blatantly leading question as the 
one posited by Judge Posner as a calculated narration not within the 
present sense impression exception. Perhaps with his hypothetical Judge 
Posner intended simply to illustrate the speed with which one can lie, 
rather than to suggest that the statement would be an admissible present 
sense impression. Still, the fact that the single example provided of a 
spontaneous lie would be excluded as a present sense impression 
                                                                                                                     
 223. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (requiring a hearsay statement “describing or explaining an 
event or condition”). 
 224. This statement might be admitted against the declarant as an adoptive admission of the 
dog’s beauty but only if offered against him as a party to litigation in which the dog’s beauty was 
of consequence. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(b). Even in this case, such a hearsay statement is 
admissible under the rules not because it is reliable but because it is fair to require a litigant to 
answer for a statement he made or adopted. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(b) advisory committee’s 
notes on the proposed rule. 
 225. Boyce, 742 F.3d at 797 (majority opinion). 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. (“The operator did not ask whether Boyce had a gun; it was [Boyce’s girlfriend] who 
first brought up the gun’s presence.”). 
 228. Id. at 797–98.  
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illustrates that the exception is not as useless in excluding the unreliable 
as Judge Posner suggested in his concurrence in Boyce.  
The point is that federal judges do not rigidly adhere to the technical 
requirements of the categorical hearsay exceptions while turning a blind 
eye to the context of a specific hearsay statement. The exceptions already 
permit bridled discretion for trial judges to measure the validity of the 
general psychological assumptions underlying them as applied to the 
human context presented by particular hearsay statements proffered at 
trial. Assuming a hearsay regime that continues to be premised largely on 
reliability as Judge Posner advocates, the requirements of the recognized 
hearsay exceptions provide ample basis for a trial judge to reject a 
particular hearsay statement that appears unreliable, notwithstanding the 
assumptions about human behavior contained in those exceptions. 
D.  Breaking Up Is Hard to Do 
Finally, any reinvention of the well-established categorical hearsay 
regime followed in all federal courts and the majority of state 
jurisdictions is certain to result in significant inefficiency as judges and 
lawyers struggle to define and embrace a new order.229 The recent 
confrontation revolution precipitated by the Crawford v. Washington 
decision in 2004 illustrates this concern.230 More than ten years after the 
Crawford opinion, judges and litigants remain embroiled in a 
cumbersome and resource-intensive effort to integrate the Crawford 
paradigm shift into contemporary trial practice.231 Arguably, the 
uncertainty and inefficiency of the Crawford revolution is increasing over 
time rather than diminishing, with the recent Williams v. Illinois decision 
obscuring the intersection between expert opinion testimony and 
confrontation rights.232 To be sure, concerns of efficient resource 
allocation must give way to issues of constitutional magnitude such as 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 8, at 1326 (“[T]he passage of time has likely 
made it more difficult as a practical matter to abolish a class-based hearsay framework, given 
litigators’ long experience with the framework and its adoption in every American jurisdiction.”); 
Paul F. Kirgis, A Legisprudential Analysis of Evidence Codification: Why Most Rules of Evidence 
Should Not Be Codified—but Privilege Law Should Be, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 809, 809 (2004) 
(“[B]road changes to the basic structure of evidence law, by way of revision, retraction, or 
expansion of the current Rules, seem unlikely at best.”). 
 230. See 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 231. See David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 115, 115 (2012) (noting that “even commentators who support the apparent goal” 
of Crawford “describe Crawford and its progeny as unstable”); Michael H. Graham, 
Confrontation Clause—Crawford/Davis/Melendez-Diaz: 2010 Application Summary—Recent 
Chaos, 46 CRIM. L. BULL. 1334 (2010) (describing “chaos” in applying Crawford). 
 232. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
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those raised by the Sixth Amendment.233 Importantly, Judge Posner’s 
criticism of the hearsay exceptions contained in the Federal Rules does 
not rest on constitutional grounds. Where constitutional imperatives do 
not mandate a reimagination of the existing hearsay regime, the 
inefficiency and uncertainty created by a design change merit careful 
consideration.234 Thus, the persistence of the existing categorical hearsay 
construct may not simply be a product of “incuriosity” or blind adherence 
to “dogma.”235 There is genuine reason to eschew a protracted and costly 
period of adjustment for the litigation process that ultimately may yield 
unsatisfactory outcomes. 
Acknowledging the imperfections of the existing categorical hearsay 
regime does not necessarily counsel in favor of change. In crafting a 
hearsay middle ground between the polar opposites of free admissibility 
and total exclusion, Article Eight of the Federal Rules may represent a 
workable compromise. The hearsay exceptions provide crucial 
information necessary to predict trial outcomes and value cases that is 
familiar to judges and litigants in every jurisdiction and that operates to 
exclude specific hearsay statements of doubtful reliability. To the extent 
that specific categorical exceptions lack adequate contemporary 
empirical support, those categories may be criticized, examined, and 
amended.236 It simply may be that alternative hearsay regimes remain 
insufficiently superior to justify the cost of switching.  
E.  Brave New World: A Hearsay Paradigm Shift 
Dismantling the entire categorical approach to hearsay enshrined in 
Article Eight of the Federal Rules to address deficiencies in a handful of 
hearsay categories thus seems inefficient and unnecessary. Retaining a 
categorical approach to hearsay evidence but amending or repealing 
specific categorical hearsay exceptions that lack rational foundations 
represents the most narrowly tailored and efficient response to criticisms 
such as those highlighted in Judge Posner’s Boyce concurrence.  
Should efforts to reform perceived flaws in certain categorical 
exceptions ultimately prove unsuccessful, however, rejection of the 
                                                                                                                     
 233. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (securing “greater speed, 
economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the price of fundamental principles 
of constitutional liberty” and stating that the “price is too high” (quoting People v. Fisher, 164 
N.E. 336, 341 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting))).  
 234. See Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 8, at 1326 (emphasizing that there is no 
guarantee that states would accept a change to the categorical hearsay regime). 
 235. See United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., concurring). 
 236. See Memorandum, supra note 198, at 3 (describing the intent to monitor case law to 
ensure that categorical exceptions are adequately filtering modern technological 
communications). 
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categorical regime certainly could be considered.237 Crucially, any 
overhaul of the hearsay system should accomplish two objectives.238 
First, it should increase the predictability and consistency of hearsay 
doctrine to promote fair and efficient valuation and resolution of 
lawsuits.239 Second and relatedly, it should eliminate the problematic 
reliability filter for hearsay evidence, leaving consideration of human 
psychology to fact finders weighing the hearsay evidence that judges 
admit. As illustrated above, the case-by-case discretionary approach 
proposed in Boyce accomplishes neither of these objectives.  
If human psychology is a weak foundation upon which to build 
hearsay rules, genuine hearsay reform should focus on alternatives to a 
reliability filter for the admission of hearsay evidence. Indeed, this is 
precisely the philosophical shift attempted by the Crawford revolution: 
movement from a malleable reliability test to a more procedural 
assessment of the availability of the hearsay declarant and the opportunity 
for prior cross-examination.240 Rather than merely transferring 
responsibility for assessing the reliability of hearsay evidence from the 
categorical hearsay exceptions to trial judges, a truly progressive 
approach would eliminate questionable assumptions of reliability as the 
gatekeeper for hearsay evidence altogether.  
Many talented scholars have theorized about alternate models for the 
admission of hearsay evidence.241 As one example, Professor Michael L. 
Seigel proposed a “best evidence hearsay rule” that would admit all 
hearsay evidence that is “the best evidence available to the offering party 
from a particular declarant source, or if the best evidence has been or will 
be presented to the trier of fact.”242 Professor Seigel critiqued 
contemporary hearsay doctrine for requiring a “determination of the 
reliability of hearsay evidence on an absolute basis,” which he 
                                                                                                                     
 237. From a pragmatic perspective, if reformers fail to gain support for alterations to existing 
categorical exceptions, it is difficult to imagine sufficient support to achieve a complete redesign 
of hearsay doctrine. See Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 8, at 1326 (“[T]he passage of time 
has likely made it more difficult as a practical matter to abolish a class-based hearsay 
framework . . . .”). But see Sklansky, Hearsay’s Last Hurrah, supra note 6, at 82 (explaining why 
“the hearsay rule has long been in decline around the globe” and “why its days are likely numbered 
in the United States, as well”). 
 238. This assumes a continued general rule against hearsay, yet a “new” approach to 
exceptions to that rule. See Eleanor Swift, Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 495, 
518 (1987) (finding justification for the continuation of a hearsay prohibition in some form). 
 239. See Bellin, Case for eHearsay, supra note 8, at 1326 (noting “ever-expanding dockets 
and increasing reliance on settlements and guilty pleas”). 
 240. Crawford introduced its own amorphous “testimonial” hearsay category as a threshold 
question to applying that test. 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (describing the “core class of ‘testimonial’ 
statements” with which the Sixth Amendment confrontation right is concerned).  
 241. See sources cited supra note 9. 
 242. Seigel, supra note 9, at 930. 
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characterized as “an impossible task.”243 He opined that “the only serious 
‘hearsay danger’ [is] the ability of a skillful advocate to make strategic 
decisions to present inferior hearsay evidence as a means of disguising 
factual weaknesses in her case.”244 Therefore, Professor Seigel viewed an 
optimal hearsay rule as one that would not exclude hearsay evidence 
“unless it is intended to be offered as a substitute for better evidence.”245  
While providing a predictable roadmap for assessing the admissibility 
of hearsay as the “best evidence,” Professor Seigel’s proposal does not 
entail slippery assessments of declarant reliability as a gateway to 
admissibility. Nor does it rely upon assumptions about human 
psychology and credibility. Rather, this proposal emphasizes alternative 
evidence available to prove the points conveyed by hearsay. Importantly, 
it accounts for hearsay evidence currently admitted through the 
admissions doctrine as well as business and public records exceptions that 
should remain admissible regardless of the availability of contributors to 
the records.246 Although this proposed approach to rationalizing hearsay 
promises to expand the admissibility of hearsay evidence, Judge Posner 
expressly noted that he was not seeking to exclude more hearsay 
evidence.247 If the goal is increased rationality in hearsay rules, then 
proposals such as Professor Seigel’s that avoid a reliability filter 
altogether are more likely to achieve the goal than alternatives that merely 
transfer a reliability determination to trial judges.248  
Again, this Article does not advocate abandonment of the existing 
categorical hearsay scheme or the embrace of an alternative approach to 
hearsay evidence. Rather, this Article seeks to illustrate that there are 
many potential responses to Judge Posner’s critique of existing hearsay 
                                                                                                                     
 243. Id. at 935. 
 244. Id. at 897. 
 245. Id. at 930. 
 246. One of the chief concerns with expanding the admissibility of hearsay through Professor 
Seigel’s best evidence proposal remained the Confrontation Clause rights of criminal defendants. 
Id. at 944 (noting that hearsay reform “might include special rules for criminal cases” and 
describing “adjustments to the best evidence hearsay rule necessitated by confrontation 
principles” as a “topic to be addressed another day”). The Supreme Court’s Crawford precedent 
subsequently articulated in 2004 serves the crucial role of protecting the criminally accused from 
facing un-cross-examined testimonial hearsay evidence outside of the evidence rules. 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 247. United States v. Boyce, 742 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 248. The unpopular and less refined approach to hearsay taken by the Model Code of 
Evidence in 1942 represents another hearsay paradigm freed from considerations of “folk 
psychology” and “reliability.” The Model Code’s vision has its obvious and well-documented 
imperfections. See supra notes 56–57. Even if a Model Code approach could be modified to 
account for its failings, as Professor Seigel has labored to do with his “best evidence” proposal, 
there is strong reason to doubt the political viability of a sea change met with “hostility” and 
“anger” in its last iteration. Id. 
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doctrine that would not tax the litigation process with uncertainty and 
inconsistency and that would represent more targeted responses to the 
criticisms raised.249 Any alteration of the recognized hearsay regime 
should make forward progress in the development of hearsay law, rather 
than revert to the inefficiencies of pre-Rules practice. After many decades 
of debate regarding the appropriate level of judicial discretion in 
administering hearsay doctrine, this Article suggests retiring once and for 
all any proposal to allow case-by-case trial judge decision-making 
regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence.  
CONCLUSION 
The recent Seventh Circuit opinion in United States v. Boyce 
highlights long-standing dissatisfaction with the categorical hearsay 
model reflected in the Federal Rules. Opining that many of the categorical 
hearsay exceptions are grounded in empirically bankrupt folk 
psychology, Judge Posner called for purely discretionary consideration 
of the reliability of particular hearsay statements by trial judges. 
Notwithstanding the potential legitimacy of the critique of certain 
existing hearsay exceptions, this Article illustrates the inferiority of the 
purely discretionary approach to hearsay evidence from a cost–benefit 
perspective.  
Further, this Article denounces a reactionary retreat from advances in 
hearsay doctrine made by the Federal Rules. The common law approach 
to hearsay that controlled prior to the Federal Rules created problems of 
access, clarity, and consistency. The categorical hearsay exceptions 
ultimately embodied in the Federal Rules were designed to ameliorate 
such shortcomings in pre-Rules hearsay doctrine. After forty years of 
living with the Federal Rules, it is not surprising that judges, litigants, and 
scholars have experienced frustration and dissatisfaction with the Federal 
Rules’ categorical approach to the complex hearsay doctrine. This Article 
suggests that potential revisions to the hearsay rules should proceed from 
a holistic perspective that seeks to address specific concerns and 
criticisms without sacrificing much-needed efficiencies achieved under 
the Federal Rules. To borrow from the law of products liability, a design 
change that addresses existing product dangers but introduces others of 
equal or greater magnitude is not superior under the law.250 The Posnerian 
hearsay model represents just such a poor design alternative.  
                                                                                                                     
 249. Indeed, the evidence advisory committee is embarking upon a “systematic review of the 
entire category of prior statements of testifying witnesses” to determine whether such statements 
should be defined as hearsay. See Memorandum, supra note 198, at 3.  
 250. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998) (“When evaluating the 
reasonableness of a design alternative, the overall safety of the product must be considered. It is 
not sufficient that the alternative design would have reduced or prevented the harm suffered by 
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The redesign of the entire hearsay regime is certainly beyond the 
modest ambitions of this Article. Nor is it the goal of this Article to 
resolve concerns about any specific hearsay exception within the existing 
framework. Rather, this Article seeks to demonstrate the significant 
drawbacks of throwing the Federal Rules baby out with the proverbial 
bathwater and to stimulate thought about more progressive responses to 
the Seventh Circuit’s articulated concerns about folk psychology. While 
the purely discretionary alternative to the existing hearsay regime 
proposed by Judge Posner in his Boyce concurrence may be unworkable, 
many criticisms of the existing regime may be legitimate. Thus, the 
question remains whether there are alternative alterations to the current 
categorical hearsay structure that could alleviate valid concerns without 
imposing costs on the trial process that eclipse any gains in rationality. 
This Article ultimately concludes that although many alternatives merit 
exploration, we must slay the hearsay discretion dragon once and for all. 
 
                                                                                                                     
the plaintiff if it would also have introduced into the product other dangers of equal or greater 
magnitude.”). 
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